


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# ***JPRS Report***



# **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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2 May 1991

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Biography of New Slovak Premier Given

LD2304215291 Prague CTK in English 1905 GMT  
23 Apr 91

[Text] Bratislava April 23 (CTK)—Newly appointed Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky was born on January 1, 1944. He studied law at Charles University in Prague, and in 1971 received his doctorate from Comenius University in Bratislava.

In the 1980's Carnogursky worked as a solicitor and defended persecuted religious activists and political dissidents. From 1981 he was no longer allowed to practice law. In August 1989 he was imprisoned and charged with subversion of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. He was released during the November 1989 "velvet revolution."

Since February 17, 1990, Carnogursky has been chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, a Slovak Government coalition partner which ranked second, after the Public Against Violence movement, in the parliamentary elections in Slovakia on June 8-9, 1990.

Carnogursky was Czechoslovak first deputy premier and a Federal Assembly deputy from December 12, 1989, to June 27, 1990. On that day he was appointed Slovak Government first deputy premier.

### VPN Politicians Seen as Target of Anti-Semitism

AU2404084291

[Editorial Report] Three Czechoslovak dailies, namely Prague LIDOVE NOVINY on 19 April, Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 19 April, and Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 22 April carry items concerning an anti-Semitic campaign aimed against Public Against Violence [VPN] politicians.

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY on 19 April on page 6 reprints from NOVY SLOVAK in Slovak (No. 14, 1991) a 1,200-word article by M. Mozer entitled "Gal's Camarilla and Talmud." Mozer observes that "Slovak political life is penetrated by people of non-Slovak origin. An excellent example of the association of non-Slovak political forces is the polarized movement of various currents in the Public Against Violence." According to Mozer, the goals of Gal's VPN Slovak Council are obvious. "They seek control over the political and executive powers in Slovakia and the suspension of so far unsuccessful political endeavors of eventual protectors of Slovak interests, Prime Minister Meciar or M. Knazko." The adherents of Gal's political line, Mozer continues, "who are closely linked and supported by the infamous centralist group of Prague Castle headed by the sincere Czechoslovakists V. Havel, J. Dienstbier, and V. Klaus" are very refined in their operation—their best weapon is the lie. "After all Talmud—the diabolical teaching" allows the cheating of a Christian "(or a Slovak)." Mozer uses other quotations

from the Talmud to make his point. "Herein is clear proof that Jews are permitted to lie in order to achieve peace and atonement." He asserts that the Talmudic quotations "seem to apply also to the VPN Coordinating Center and Slovak Council." Next, Mozer speaks of other means used by "Gal's Talmudic camarilla to deceive the masses," namely the carefully premeditated use of sensitive democratic slogans (tolerance, decency, etc.). This leads Mozer to the conclusion that "the saying is still valid that anti-Semitism is strongest where numerous Jews oppose the interests of the nation."

Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak on 19 April on page 2, under the headline "Who Taints the Water," publishes a 100-word "jg"-signed report on Federal Assembly Deputy Peter Kulan finding in his mail slot an envelope stamped "Office of the Slovak National Council" that contained three anti-Semitic documents. The same day, on 22 April on page 2, under the title "Who Sows the Wind?" publishes a 200-word interview with Deputy Kulan by VEREJNOST correspondent Juraj Gressner on the above incident. The place and date of the interview are not given. Kulan describes here the anti-Semitic material he has received. The first document accuses most Czechoslovak politicians—Kulan names three of them: Vaclav Havel, Vaclav Klaus, and Jiri Dienstbier—as well as Charter 77 signatories, of conspiring with the world Zionist and Freemason organizations. The second, according to Kulan, originated abroad, and it describes the United Nations as an organization controlled by Jews. Finally, the last one represents T.G. Masaryk as an archenemy of Slovaks. Kulan believes that the stamp of the Office of the Slovak National Council is a provocation and that the envelope could have been placed there by a casual visitor. Kulan concludes the interview by saying that he passed the envelope on to Interior Minister Langos.

## HUNGARY

### Foreign Radio Broadcasts To Be Curtailed

AU1904221491 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET  
in Hungarian 18 Apr 91 p 4

[Interview with Andras Gulyas, head of the Press Department of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, by Kurcz; place and date not given: "Radio Affair: Will the Foreign Broadcast Editorial Office Become a Government Station?"—first paragraph is MAGYAR NEMZET introduction]

[Text] By his unilateral decision to consider a drastic reduction in the activity of the Hungarian Radio's Foreign Broadcasts Editorial Office [KAF], the chairman of Hungarian Radio has made the future of Hungarian Radio's foreign broadcasts uncertain. The KAF staff turned to the parliament and the government for help. They mainly lamented the plans to silence Hungarian broadcasts to neighboring countries. Our parliament's Foreign Committee discussed the fate of the KAF last week and, following this exchange of views, it seems that

the Foreign Ministry, which has always supported the issue of foreign radio broadcasts, is ready to help the KAF.

[Gulyas] The presidium of the Hungarian Radio also called upon the Foreign Ministry in connection with the KAF issue and the staff in charge of preparing foreign broadcasts also sent a letter to us, in addition to the parliament.

[Kurcz] What is the Foreign Ministry's stand on the plan to restrict the foreign broadcasts?

[Gulyas] In our view, the continuation of foreign language radio broadcasts is in our national interest, so that listeners in neighboring countries and all over the world can learn about the Hungarian position and hear news from Hungary in the fastest and most direct way possible. Therefore, the Foreign Ministry took upon itself to coordinate the organizational, personnel, and financial conditions with all the factors involved in order to ensure the future of these foreign broadcasts.

[Kurcz] Apparently, there are plans to completely silence the Russian, Romanian, and Serbo-Croatian programs.

[Gulyas] The Foreign Ministry also feels very badly about these plans because this is clearly a loss for us from a foreign policy viewpoint. However, we hope that this is only a temporary decision. We will do everything in our power to make sure that this temporary restriction and the reduction in broadcast times and languages are not accompanied by a total elimination of this department. It is a welcome development that representatives of various parties in the Foreign Committee agreed that this country needed these foreign broadcasts.

[Kurcz] What does your participation in the "radio affair" mean? Will you accept the huge financial burden involved in the KAF operation?

[Gulyas] We believe that such broadcasts can only be financed by public sources. In our opinion, initial sources are available for radio operations too, and we must save these funds received by the national media for foreign broadcast purposes. If the Foreign Ministry is able to really prove the importance of this task during the budget debate in the parliament, it will be able to avoid the financial restrictions.

[Kurcz] If the KAF organization separated from Hungarian Radio, would this mean that the Foreign Ministry would simply incorporate the KAF within it or, similar to foreign practice, the KAF would be promoted by the Foreign Ministry?

[Gulyas] This possibility has also been considered. For example, the successful operation of the BBC International Service is a good example for us to follow. Actually, we agree with the opinions of the KAF staff and leaders, opinions that the president of the Hungarian Radio also shares in his study he wrote for the Cultural Committee, namely that the KAF should separate from

Hungarian Radio as a whole. To put it more diplomatically, in such a case the Foreign Ministry would not exclude the possibility of taking upon itself the responsibility for the operation of the KAF.

[Kurcz] How would it be possible to guarantee the further independence of the KAF and to make sure that it does not become a government radio station?

[Gulyas] Our intentions do not go in this direction at all. The Foreign Ministry state secretary assured the members of the Foreign Committee that the Foreign Ministry is not interested in maintaining and operating such a government radio station. We would be glad if everyone realized that we are striving to create conditions for objective information independent of all party views. We envisage a presidium leadership with the participation of radio experts and representatives of the Hungarian parliament's Foreign Committee and Cultural Committee, and representatives of other organizations who are responsible for, and have something to say in connection with genuine information beamed abroad. In my opinion, the Foreign Ministry could play a coordinating role in this organization, to contribute to a more efficient operation. I am convinced that the aforementioned body to be set up with the participation of various political forces present in the parliament will provide adequate guarantee for the assertion of the interests of the Hungarian Republic in these foreign broadcasts.

#### **Tamas Katona on Soviet-Hungary General Agreement**

*LD2304090991 Budapest MTI in English 0641 GMT 23 Apr 91*

[Text] London, 23 April (MTI)—The point is not to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union or to organize a summit at any price, but to come to an agreement that is current and serves the interests of both sides, Tamas Katona, political state secretary of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry told MTI's correspondent in London on Monday.

Katona is currently attending an international conference in London.

"We are ready to give the Soviet Union all of the 'negative' guarantees for security to which it is entitled and we are asking for similar guarantees for ourselves. However, we consider the Soviet demand that neither side enter any organization directed against the other passe, and we think that it recalls times before the change of the system," Katona said.

Katona went on to say that "though we can conclude an agreement under equal conditions, Hungary and the Soviet Union will never be in one class. In case the concept of 'enemy organization' is defined by Moscow, I wonder whether Hungary might be barred from becoming a member of the EC.

"We have already come to an agreement in nearly all of the questions and there are only problems of terminology to be solved, so as not to make the agreement either too restrictive or too general, but to make it correspond to the reality of the late 20th century.

"We have, of course, coordinated our views with Czechoslovakia and Poland."

#### **Former Finance Ministers on New Financial Plan**

*AU1904084591 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 15 Apr 91 p 9*

[Article by Gyorgyi Rajna: "Little Scope for Maneuver in a Constrained Course"]

[Excerpts] It was a rare moment when the three previous ministers of finance, Peter Medgyessy, Laszlo Bekesi, and Ferenc Rabar, sat at the table over the weekend to give their opinion about the present finance minister's economic program. Peter Kiraly, administrative state secretary at the Ministry of Finance, represented the drafters of the program and fended off the attacks at a debate organized by the University of Economics.

Ferenc Rabar said that the scope of Hungary's fiscal policy is limited, its possibilities are limited, and the economy is following a constrained course. It is impossible to do extraordinary things, even if the emphasis is on different things at different times. In this respect, the program has hardly any new features except for placing greater emphasis on reorganizing ownership. [passage omitted]

Laszlo Bekesi is in the fortunate position of having been one of those who prepared the last program before the change of government. This was finished by the end of 1989 and was intended to last three years. The program's three subtitles were the following: stabilization, transition, and development. It had four basic aims, namely to remove politics from the economy, to preserve the ability of the economy to function through powerful crisis management, to remove the state apparatus from the economy, and to carry out a very consistent fiscal and monetary policy. The program was not built on shock therapy but on the principle of accelerated progressivity. It would have led to establishing the basis of a socialist market economy. It came to light that we wanted to solve the problem of stabilization by crisis management, including the improvement of the balance of payments, curbing inflation, tackling unemployment, and creating a social welfare net. We notice the first difference regarding the last issue. According to Laszlo Bekesi, a very characteristic difference is reflected in the second major point, the issue of ownership, namely that the basic principle of the previous program was getting rid of politics while the present program is based on politics. Compensation and returning ownership are two of these issues. Laszlo Bekesi considers these to be fatal. The matter of ownership has to be arranged on the basis of economic efficiency. The second big difference concerns the orientation of foreign trade. It was well known

that the CEMA could not be the road leading to the future. However, the drastic cut back in our relations carried out by the present government never even appeared in our nightmares. The third major difference regards the convertibility of the forint, not as an aim, but in how it is achieved. It was envisioned as a step in the natural development of the economy, not as a preconception. According to Bekesi, the last difference is that the Kupa program ignores today's reality, and nothing indicates that all will magically change in 1992 and become positive. Of course, programs always have to reflect a driving force and optimism. [passage omitted]

Peter Medgyessy stated: "I do not know the program very well, but as far as I can see it rests on a confused political concept, it is an unfortunate mixture of the notions of privatization and reprivatization. Besides, the Kupa program avoids the question of whether a strictly fiscal policy can work effectively today when enterprises are lining up for credit." [passage omitted]

What would Laszlo Bekesi do differently today? The former minister of finance drew our attention to three critical points that are not covered by the present program. Our government "spoiled Hungarian-Soviet relations with an astonishingly sinful foreign policy," and as a result, unemployment increased enormously. "I see no chance for a solution," he said. The second sensitive point is the impossible economic situation the self-governing bodies find themselves in. The money will run out in most locations in half a year, and there is great pressure on the budget. Laszlo Bekesi finds it astonishing that the coalition believes it can destroy the self-governing bodies that have an opposition majority by virtue of their defenselessness, and still come out at the end peacefully. The third important question is inflation, which is a heavy burden on the masses, and whose handling by the welfare system has not yet been solved. [passage omitted]

#### **Poll Measures Underlying Political Attitudes**

*91CH0523A Budapest VILAG in Hungarian 3 Apr 91  
pp 26-27*

[Article by Gabor Varnai: "The Invisible Colors on the Political Palette—Which Nevertheless Slowly Become Visible"]

[Text] In February 1990 and a year later, in February 1991 the Hungarian Public Opinion Research Institute conducted two surveys on this subject using questionnaires and a 1,000-person national representative sample. (We published the results of the first survey in our 12 July 1990 issue under the title "The Invisible Colors on the Political Palette.")

We tried to learn about the political views, outlook, and fundamental feelings of the country's population in the moments preceding the elections and after the local elections.

In the course of the survey a few statements were read to the respondents. They were asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed with these statements. The series of statements (published in our article last year) were aimed to reveal deep-seated political values. These values have not shifted substantially during the past year, nevertheless there is something that became unequivocally clear.

During the past year both the "wild Hungarian" and the "adoration of the West" attitudes have significantly declined, i.e., the responses became more balanced. On the other hand, not much more than this can be said as a result of a more thorough analysis.

In examining the distribution of responses, in 1990 we distinguished between four so-called attitudinal groups (groups characterized by outlook or feelings)—essentially four political vectors. As of 1991 the number and character of these attitudinal groups has changed (from four to five):

1990 Attitudinal Groups and Their Ratios	
European	44%
National	18%
Uncertain	12%
Politically passive	26%

1991 Attitudinal Groups and Their Ratios	
Radical liberal	11%
Social liberal	14%
Moderate liberal	25%
Populist	27%
Politically passive	23%

The change manifests itself in the fact that the various attitudinal groups became more pronounced. Those who were uncertain a year ago definitely shifted to a lesser extent toward the populist trend, and to a greater extent toward the liberal trend. A certain restructuring has taken place, as a result of which the ratio of liberal attitudinal groups has increased, while liberalism itself has begun to undergo an internal differentiation. The group of politically passive persons has remained substantially unchanged. We must add however, that according to the local election results, the group of "politically passive" persons is "passive" only from the standpoint of "party politics." By now, they possess their own political subculture in other respects.

The "Europeans" of 1990 were in agreement primarily with statements related to uplift, self-reliance, independence, and the peculiar character of the nation, and mainly with those which flowed from the pluralism of ideals, from liberal values in general. It was characteristic that respondents expressly disagreed with statements which had their basis in viewing the nation as an absolute and which spoke in terms of falling behind and catching up. Their political likings at the time clearly

favored the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Social Democratic Party. Within this 44 percent we found rather young people who completed their skilled-worker training or higher-level education, skilled workers, entrepreneurs, or white-collar workers, mostly city residents in 1990. At that time, the "Europeans" were fundamentally and uniformly social liberals, and as their responses revealed, under no circumstances were they "devoid of national sentiments" even at that time.

In the course of a year the 1990 group of "Europeans" became rather varied. Let's take a look at the radical liberals who represent 11 percent of the survey population. The difference between these and the previous "European" group is that based on a critical view of the situation, the radical liberals are clearly Western oriented. These are mainly young, highly educated residents of Budapest who may be found everywhere ranging from housing developments to the elite areas, and who are not religious in terms of any kind of bigotry. From a political standpoint they clearly sympathize with the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] and with the Association of Young Democrats.

Members of the social liberal group which represents 14 percent of the 1991 survey population "inherited" the idea of social protection from their "European" character, i.e., that they did not ascribe as much importance to change, but instead emphasized the equal status of the market and the social safety net. This group is characterized by relatively well-educated, skilled workers and office workers residing primarily in the countryside. Most of these people sympathize with the SZDSZ and FIDESZ [Association of Young Democrats], but some of their confidence in the Hungarian Socialist Party and in the Hungarian Democratic Forum survived (part of this group came from the "uncertain" category). This is the group which lost its economic and cultural roots at the beginning of the Kadar era, and even its perspectives by the end of the Kadar era. For this reason, this is the most endangered group. A year ago they had great confidence in the social democrats and in the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], but their confidence has greatly declined since.

The third group of "heirs" is that of the moderate liberals (25 percent). They were recruited in part from among the "Europeans," and in part from the "uncertain" group. This group is most emphatic about the need for the balanced development of both the countryside and the capital, and its members firmly stand on the foundations of Western liberalism. From the standpoint of social belonging, only one matter characterizes this group, but in a most pronounced fashion: They are entrepreneurs. They are neither devoid of religion, nor are they bigots: Religious belonging is their private concern. Their political likings were also attracted by smaller parties which received less than 4 percent of the vote in the elections, in addition to the liberal bloc comprised of the SZDSZ and FIDESZ.

In 1990 the thinking of the second group was expressly national in orientation. They represented 18 percent of the population. Their way of thinking was less varied than that of the "Europeans," they stressed the restoration of the old glory of the Hungarian people more than a modern European character. Statements made by members of this group indicate that these people were guided by comparisons between the past and the future, and between backwardness and Western levels of development. From a political standpoint, they sympathized primarily with the MDF, but they were also strongly attracted by the Independent Smallholders, Agricultural Workers and Citizen Party [FKgP] and the FIDESZ. Fundamentally, however, they were opposed to politics "on a grand scale," and professed the superiority of work and national unity over politics. Within this group we often found lower-educated, unskilled, or untrained workers and older people who lived on the city peripheries. In their minds the uplift of the nation was tied to religiousness. We could say that this group provided the main base for what was called "national center" in those days.

We can still find them, and their number has even increased so as to constitute 27 percent of the population, as a result of winning over some of the "undecided." The national character as well as the uniform thinking of this group has become more pronounced, and there is a preponderance of populist-conservative features in this group. This is because within this group the inclination to become monolithic, and to espouse authoritarian principles has increased strongly, and the group is increasingly becoming opposed to pluralism. They frequently profess that various ideals cannot peacefully coexist in this country. This thought was not part of their mentality a year ago. From the standpoint of social composition, this group is the same as the national group of a year ago, their religious feelings may be regarded more or less as bigotry, and their likings are clearly attached to the governing coalition (to the constituent political parties of the coalition, without distinction).

The size of the politically passive group amounted to 26 percent in 1990 and to 23 percent in 1991. This change is within the sampling error rate and thus, may be disregarded. It is composed of the same elderly, low educational level villagers, agricultural workers, unskilled and untrained workers, pensioners, and housewives as a year before. One often finds these people in old peasant houses located in deteriorated areas. They are clearly religious, but their religious sentiments are not tied to politics.

Based on an analysis of today's attitudinal groups we may conclude that while liberalism is becoming more differentiated, populism is moving in a more monolithic, authoritarian direction. At the same time it is important to observe that it was not possible to delineate an attitudinal group which unequivocally manifested so-called alternative-anarchist characteristics, or an equally unequivocal conservative attitudinal group. The alternative-anarchist group may be part of the various liberal

groups, while most people from the conservative group may be found within the politically passive group, and to a lesser extent in the populist group.

Our findings appear to have been confirmed by a party preference survey conducted at the same time as this survey. The party preference survey shows that the ratio of the populist governing coalition versus the liberal opposition, also taking into consideration political activity, agrees with the proportionate distribution of our attitudinal groups.

This is indicated by the following table. In it we disregarded our politically passive attitudinal group, and from the party ranking we omitted respondents (36 percent of the total population) who indicated that they would not vote or did not know for whom they would vote, and those who would vote for parties which scored under 4 percent (and whose 36 percent ratio corresponds with the ratio produced by the parliamentary elections):

**TRADITIONALISTS:**

Attitudinal Groups	In Percent
Populist	35
Total:	35
Political Parties:	In Percent
MDF	17
FKgP	12
Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP]	7
Total:	36

**MODERNIZERS:**

Attitudinal Groups	In Percent
Radical liberal	14
Social liberal	18
Moderate liberal	33
Total	65
Political Parties	In Percent
FIDESZ	28
SZDSZ	27
MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]	9
Total:	64

The lesson to be learned from the table: If parliamentary elections were held today, counting on the uninhibited manifestation of political attitudes, short of 2.66 percentage points, the present opposition would enjoy a two-thirds majority in the parliament. Counting on the uninhibited manifestation of political attitudes is appropriate if the now frequently used political demagoguery, indoctrination, propaganda, and mystification between the two rounds of parliamentary elections on the one hand, and the propensity of party sympathizers to vote and "party stability" on the other have balanced their mutual effects.



**Biro, Pozsgay To Form New Center Party in May**  
*AU2304112991 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP*  
*in Hungarian 22 Apr 91 p 3*

[Interview with Zoltan Biro, cofounder of planned new Hungarian center party, by B.J.; place and date not given: "Pozsgay and Biro Will Start in May"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Public opinion has been speculating for weeks about the possible foundation of a new party by Imre Pozsgay and Zoltan Biro. The latest news has confirmed expectations; the national center party movement will shortly be launched under the auspices of the two politicians. We asked Zoltan Biro about the aims and launching of the new organization.

[Biro] After lengthy deliberation, we decided to found this new organization. Allow me to tell you about our reasoning. We feel that a sizeable vacuum has developed in Hungarian politics, a vacuum that is conspicuous even within a functioning multiparty system. This vacuum is not filled by a single party or organization at the moment, although a lot of people claim to represent national values. Maybe this explains the widespread apathy in our population, because, once again, it seems that political decisions are made above people's heads, and that society's viewpoints are not taken into consideration. We believe that this alienation could only be cured by a party or a social movement which represents the national center.

[B.J.] How would you define the term "national center?"

[Biro] Naturally, we would not only use this term in the general sense, but with reference to the present situation. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to refer to the founding document of the Hungarian Democratic Forum because at the time, one of the aims of the Forum was to promote national unity. In any case, we would like to maintain unity in the democratic transition of our society, and we would also like to represent national interests and national values.

We have to acknowledge the fact that, nowadays, if a political organization establishes itself as rightwing or leftwing, it also has to give up an enormous number of values. Yet today, what we need most of all are so-called "value-integrating" organizations...!

We feel that today's political parties have "over-ideologized" their own image. We, on the other hand, believe that pragmatic thinking would be more timely. In other words, we try to find practical solutions, not just relevant ideologies, to specific problems.

[B.J.] When will the new movement be launched and who will your partners be?

[Biro] Time is short, and although we do not wish to act too soon, we will definitely be launching the national center party organization in May. It would be too early to

talk about our partners, given that the idea of this foundation is so closely associated with our two names.

In any case, the rumor according to which our friends who appeared in Szekesfehervar will form the main body of the party is completely unfounded. In Szekesfehervar, as guests, we simply expressed our opinions about the past and the present. The future is an even more remote issue.

### **Hysteria, Naivete About Fascist Threat Scored**

*91CH0523C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP*  
*in Hungarian 27 Mar 91 p 5*

[Interview with Istvan Schlett, political scientist, by Laszlo Magyar; place and date not given: "Conversation With Istvan Schlett: Whether a Fascist Threat Exists in Hungary; Two Extremes: Hysteria and Naivete"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] Could symptoms which appear in Hungarian domestic politics with increasing frequency be regarded as a fascist threat, and could we speak of being threatened this way? We expect to receive an answer to this fundamental question from Istvan Schlett, Lorand Eotvos University of Sciences docent, political scientist.

[Magyar] They used to say that fascism had three ingredients: a leader with a sense of mission, a certain social stratum whose members may gain importance by following this "fuhrer," and finally, a tense economic and political situation which enables this stratum to take power by proclaiming some new order. What is your view of this perception?

[Schlett] I am afraid that this definition constitutes an oversimplification. Therefore, we should clarify what fascism actually is. Considering the German, Italian, and other types of fascism between the two world wars we could enumerate many common characteristics, among them the totalitarian system's total disregard for the guiding principle and for the parliament, the laws and the rules of social coexistence. These characteristics also include a categorical concept of society which thinks merely in terms of a people and a nation, and the virtually mystic, enlarged enemy image which finds the source of all trouble in Jews and in other internal and external enemies. The concept of an offended nation, the endeavor to show force, and the "military game," i.e., the militarization of the entire society, etc., are also characteristic features. I could go on mentioning a few more characteristics.

[Magyar] Let us return to our original question, because even if the concept is oversimplified, there might be some truth to it....

[Schlett] Undoubtedly, there is. And since we are still talking about the fascism of various countries between the two world wars, I would first respond to this question: At what point in time could fascism gain power at all? History, as in the case of Germany, tells us that a

"fuhrer" is able to emerge if there are no proven methods, institutions (parliament, parties, interest groups), or socially accepted, credible public personalities which are able to resolve the intensified social tensions. In Germany, the methods that people became accustomed to under Emperor Wilhelm had become useless, and the means available to the new Weimar democracy were still not sufficiently effective. This is why the two extremist parties, the Nazi and the Communist Party were able to increase their influence on the masses, and the party I mentioned first became victorious.

[Magyar] Let us perhaps discuss the leaders, because you did not cast doubt on the fact that fascism could not exist without a "fuhrer."

[Schlett] Do you think that there exist such self-appointed leaders in Hungary? Journalists are always surprised when the person interviewed returns with a question...but so as not to avoid answering: I am cautious about not stigmatizing as a "fascist" any person who becomes the subject of this discussion. On the other hand, I will note that the public, without labeling it one way or another, is disturbed by Istvan Csurka's extremist utterances, or for example, by Torgyan's tirades! We will return to the matter of the extent to which this restlessness is justified. But at this point let me state that I know of no notable politician in today's Hungary of whom I could say that he resembled a fascist leader. This, of course, does not rule out the possibility that a given extreme historical situation "could not produce" such people. But I repeat, today there are no such leaders among the noted politicians.

[Magyar] This is reassuring. And where do we stand with smaller or larger masses of people who might feel that they could make their mark in history if they followed a leader? It is a well-known fact that the Arrow Cross people recruited their mass base primarily from the lumpen elements of cities.

[Schlett] In every revolution or counterrevolution the ones who have least to lose will mount the barricades first. But I repeat, let us not oversimplify these matters. People like this volunteer mostly to serve in commandos.

Except for the fact that when it came to voting for Hitler some 12 million petty bourgeois people and workers cast their votes in his favor in the 1933 elections. I do not know whether you have read Hans Fallada's novel "What Will Be Your Fate, Little Man?" It deals with a decent department store salesman who dedicates his life to his family, but loses his job, is unable to support his family and feels that he has no future. This is followed by the expectation of Messiah....

[Magyar] And finally, how large a mass base does fascism have today in Hungary?

[Schlett] It is insignificant. The extremist National Association of Hungarians who proclaimed that they would topple the Freedom statue on Gellert Mountain were

able to muster only a few hundred people. I could give you many examples which prove that this is presently the situation. But rather large masses may become part of the extreme rightwing magic sphere, if, as I said, the legitimate, parliamentary method of conflict management went bankrupt.

[Magyar] As long as you do not rule out, in theory, even the possibility of this, why did you suggest not too long ago that the fascist threat can be exaggerated? Did you not have this in mind at the time?

[Schlett] Yes, Istvan Bibó talked about this matter relative to German fascism. He said that it was backed by German hysteria. This is why it would not benefit us if we were to make the mistake of developing a Hungarian hysteria, if we were not confident that a broad parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty system, an open society, and developed methods of interest reconciliation were the best antidotes to the fascist threat. Even though these antidotes are only in the process of evolving in Hungary, a chance indeed exists to prevent either the extreme right or the extreme left from taking power.

[Magyar] Accordingly, our concern, our fear is greater than what would be justified?

[Schlett] The threat may be large enough to deserve all of our concern, but we should not lose our sense of reality.

#### Law Allowing Private Lawyers Proposed

91CH0523B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
30 Mar 91 p 5

[Article by A.S.: "The Private Lawyers Are Coming"]

[Text] NEPSZABADSAG has learned that the parliament was expected to begin a general debate on 8 April over cabinet-proposed amendments to the law governing attorneys. Private law offices may be established throughout the country beginning in the middle of this year if representatives give a green light to the proposal.

Responding to a NEPSZABADSAG question, Dr. Zoltan Nagy, Justice Ministry division head said that with the approval of the proposed amendments attorneys will be able to practice law not only in the framework of work cooperatives, but also individually. Persons admitted to the bar may practice law. The criteria for admission are accurately described in the proposed legal provision. These are: completion of studies in the field of law, passing the bar examination, Hungarian citizenship, permanent residence in Hungary, no criminal record, malpractice insurance and membership in the lawyer's insurance group, and self-support association. The proposal also specifies exclusionary grounds.

The amendments would discontinue limitations on the number of practicing lawyers, i.e., no restrictions would exist as to the number of lawyers practicing in Hungary, or concerning the number of lawyers' work cooperatives

that may be formed within the jurisdiction of a given bar association. Dr. Nagy stressed that affected persons may challenge in court a determination which is to their detriment.

### TV Official on Political Mudslinging

*AU2204135891 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP  
in Hungarian 19 Apr 91 p 4*

[Interview with Adam Horvath, artistic director at Hungarian Television, by Zsuzsa Szep; place and date not given: "Intermission Due to Restructuring?"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Excerpts] We came to ask about the financial affairs of Hungarian Television, about unrealistically high incomes, and about money superfluously spent, but instead, we were informed about the nadir of television and about expected intermissions. We were told that television was the victim of party squabbles, and that as a result, MTV [Hungarian Television] employees only sensed chaos and insecurity. [passage omitted]

[Szep] Why do MTV's internal restructurings depend on politics?

[Horvath] Because MTV's screen personalities and chief editors are key individuals. Under the former regime, they rose above their screen characters, and with some support, they became leaders. It was easier for the authorities to be in direct contact with those who appeared on the screen, rather than to go through various officials. It was particularly during the last 10 years that this guard of leaders emerged, the leaders who also appeared in the electronic media.

As a result, Hungary's screen personalities today are far more influential than anywhere else in the world, and furthermore, they have different political orientations. Moreover, they are incapable of making a distinction between their personal opinions and their work. Politics are more confrontational than ever before, and that is why some editorial offices seem partial, one way or another. That is why they start making accusations about each other.

[Szep] In other words, MTV is not a national television, but an institution operating under the influence of political parties.

[Horvath] In the past, there were programs which came under the direct influence of "the party," but today, these programs operate in the shadow of party mudslinging. The first accusation that can be leveled at a creative group is that it used to serve the party state, and then follows the argument that certain groups see screen personalities as their allies, or as their enemies.

[Szep] How could television be objective?

[Horvath] That would depend on our moral restructuring. [passage omitted]

### New 'Social Democratic' Paper To Be Published

*LD2304215391 Budapest MTV Television Network  
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 23 Apr 91*

[Text] A new paper to be published soon will reflect leftwing, social democratic concepts. Its title is CSAK AZERT IS. The paper, introduced today, is to be published monthly, with 4,000 copies. It is not linked to any social democratic party. The main purpose of the editors is to respect the principle of social solidarity.

## POLAND

### Foreign Policy Toward Middle East Outlined

*91EP0398A Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
14 Mar 91 p 3*

[Interview with Jan Wojciech Piekarski, deputy director of the Asia, Africa, Australia, and Oceania Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Jerzy Rajch; place and date not given: "A New Look at the Middle East"]

[Text] [Rajch] As recently as two years ago the Persian Gulf region had, in practice, been closed to Poland. We maintained diplomatic relations only with Iraq and Kuwait. The events of the last few months showed that this is a region of great importance to the entire world.

[Piekarski] We caught up with our years-long arrears in the last dozen or so months when we established diplomatic relations with Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. The war in the Gulf disrupted our greatly advanced bilateral attempts to establish relations with Bahrain. Things are looking pretty good for us to remain in Saudi Arabia.

[Rajch] Remain?

[Piekarski] Yes. As you know, we maintain a Polish military contingent there. Our charge d'affaires in Kuwait at present resides in Riyadh. We still lack diplomatic relations, but the climate for them is good. That is why I am using the term "remain." We are waiting, because Saudi Arabia is busy with the war and all its legacies. We shall revert to the matter as soon as the situation becomes somewhat normalized. Even now we know that the Saudi's approach to Poland's presence in the Arabian Peninsula is more than just positive.

[Rajch] In the past we had made no attempts to consolidate relations with OPEC countries. Yet, it is not just since yesterday that they have been extracting oil.

[Piekarski] In the past there were no such possibilities. The reasons were several, but the most important one was the unwillingness of the Persian Gulf countries to establish political and economic relations with communist countries. The Kuwaiti crisis prolonged that period, but it pointed up even more clearly the importance of that region. The huge financial resources of the Gulf countries have prompted the entire world to want to invest and export there. There is also the reverse flow of

substantial surplus capital. Although we did not have political relations with the Gulf countries in the past, we were present there economically. Our annual exports to Saudi Arabia averaged about \$16 million and to the United Arab Emirates \$13 million. The possibilities are, of course, much greater.

[Rajch] In the past we had other priorities and specified options such as Iraq and Libya. Has the situation now changed fundamentally?

[Piekarski] I would not view it in these terms. The end of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's is a period of great change not only in East Europe; it also is a period of certain reappraisals in the Arab countries. We all must keep up with the changes. The Gulf war has shown—this being an experience both to us and the Arab countries and to the world community—how international cooperation can prevent the spread of aggression. This is leading to certain conclusions.

Undoubtedly the image of the Polish presence in the Arab countries will now be different. With regard to [Poland's previous approach to] Iraq and Libya, politics did indeed outweigh economics, but not conclusively, because in the 1970's we had maintained some 15,000 or so experts apiece in these two countries but we did not lose financially thereby.

In 1989 Polish foreign trade with Arab countries totaled about \$1 billion, of which two-thirds was Polish exports. The subsequent year was worse, with the positive balance of trade somewhat declining. Our biggest partners continued to be Iraq and Libya. Now this year will be the year of the turning point, although we do not intend to break with these partners. We want to open precisely to the countries of the Persian Gulf and to begin cooperation with Egypt and the countries of the Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Thereby also we shall bring up our foreign relations in that region to a suitable level.

[Rajch] But all the previous obligations would first have to be settled.

[Piekarski] Certainly. Take Libya, for example. Poland does not intend to break relations with that country, but merely to normalize them, without any unnecessary privileges and preferences. Everything on the principle of equal partnership. Poland is a debtor of Libya. We want to regulate this and follow the principles of mutual respect for the interests of both parties.

[Rajch] Let us stick to Arab topics. There used to be an Arabic Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but now its appellation comprises one-half of the world.

[Piekarski] I can guess what you mean. A couple of years ago we used to have the Africa and Middle East Department. However, in that region it just is not possible to follow the same classification as for, say, Europe. For example, how can Iran and Israel be considered in isolation from the Arabic countries? They cannot, really.

That accounts for such a voluminous scope of the department and its name. But that is not the point. As always, the heart of the matter is the experts. And we do have them. You yourself know of and are acquainted with such experts as Dworak, Plominski, and Balinski.

[Rajch] Of course, they are diplomats who always rise to the occasion.

[Piekarski] After all, it is the human element that always matters. In certain regions of the world conventional dividing lines cannot apply. Turkey, too, could be included within any one of several departments. But the Moslem world is large, stretching from Casablanca to Indonesia, inclusive of India. The point is to properly represent the interests of the Polish Republic, whether in Warsaw or in small outposts. The smaller the outposts—and they do predominate in this department—the better the experts required. The performance of a diplomatic outpost hinges on every one of its members. In a five-person embassy incompetence is more evident than in a 50-person one.

[Rajch] That is indeed the heart of the matter. Sometimes, however, a random accident is of help. Do not you think that, so far as the Gulf is concerned, Saddam Hussein helped us by making possible rapprochement with Saudi Arabia?

[Piekarski] Diplomacy consists in exploiting opportunities. However, the Gulf war is no matter of accident. Did Hussein help? He did and he did not, in the sense in which you were asking. No one can foretell the future. Iraq has a chance of remaining our partner, particularly considering that it is going to undergo major changes. And besides, the UN sanctions do not extend to diplomatic relations. That is why we want the Polish ambassador to return shortly to Baghdad, in order to safeguard our interests and the assets left behind. There is no doubt that, once the United Nations Security Council waives the economic sanctions, the structure of our cooperation and trade will change. Everything indicates that in the new situation there will be no reason for arms deliveries. We shall conform, besides, to the decisions of the United Nations.

[Rajch] We have been speaking of the Arabic countries but the picture would be incomplete without mentioning Israel. Quite recently we reestablished diplomatic relations with that country. Does not this strike a dissonant chord, so to speak?

[Piekarski] Certainly not. It is a normal world practice to maintain contacts with various countries, including even those with a totally different attitude toward reality. Poland cannot be considered two-faced in this respect, since her relations with Israel are neither secret nor enacted offstage. In one way, this case is unprecedented, because, willy-nilly, the fate of both our nations has been for centuries intertwined in a very special manner. Poland's absence in Israel for many years had been disadvantageous to us, as had been the absence of mutual dialogue.

[Rajch] Now that we have established these relations, what position will we take on the Israeli-Palestinian question?

[Piekarski] That would be the subject of a separate interview. In a nutshell, our view of these matters has not changed, because it is based on fundamental principles of international relations and normal human values. We emphasize the rights of the Palestinians to a country of their own. But we are not going to take a position in advance on specific issues, which we consider to be subject to peaceful negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. Here the United Nations may act as a catalyst for the negotiating processes.

Poland supports the sovereign and secure development of every country and nation, but it does not pretend to the position of a guarantor of even regional security.

[Rajch] Thank you for the interview.

### **Intricacies, Problems of Legislation Discussed**

*91EP0399A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 18 Mar 91 p IV*

[Interview with Minister Kazimierz Malecki, secretary of the Council of Ministers, and Maciej Graniecki, under secretary of state responsible for legislation in the Office of the Council of Ministers, by Krystyna Chrupkowa; individual respondents not identified in text; place and date not given: "The Legislative Program Is a Function of the Government Program"]

[Text] [Chrupkowa] For a long time I have been saying that the worse a government is the more laws it promulgates. Seen from this point of view, what will J.K. Bielecki's cabinet be like?

[Respondent] Were this assertion to hold true, those previous administrations which did most to reform this country and, as a consequence, issue numerous laws, would have to be considered the worst. After all, law is the sole instrument for this purpose.

If, however, this subversive assertion were to be approached in all seriousness, the administration of J. K. Bielecki would deserve most a plus grade. That is because Prime Minister Bielecki will issue a relatively minimal number of new laws, but not because—as the political calendar indicates—he shall not last long in his position. It is rather because Mr. Bielecki represents the patently pragmatic, in the positive meaning of the term, option of continuing and developing what is good and correcting what is bad. Accordingly, he does not announce any reformist fireworks, any starting from scratch, in accordance with some [idea of] "our solely workable concepts."

By now it appears that the specter of a torrent of new laws has been put to rest. Moreover, it is high time to infer conclusions from the fact that Poland is not the Third Republic. This means a principled rejection of

"rooting" in previous legislation and its partial revision, along with transition, as needed, to an integral regulation consonant with new institutional and economic criteria.

[Chrupkowa] But this will have to wait until the new constitution is passed.

[Respondent] We cannot wait; we do not have the time. Besides, we must reconstruct laws so as to adapt them to European standards, considering that we are knocking so strongly at the door bearing the nameplate Europe.

[Chrupkowa] Indeed, Europe is not very interested in the "moral order" we are offering it, but it is interested in a most up-to-date and explicit system of laws.

[Respondent] That also is why, e.g., a draft law regulating the whole of the problems affecting joint ventures has by now been completed and submitted to the Sejm. In general, the legislative program of the government, which is a function of the government's program of action, is concise and concerns only a few but fundamental domains needing an updating of their legal aspects.

This is, as it were, the first priority. The second is implementing the already passed laws, which requires issuing some 100 implementing regulations which are as yet in arrears. Their importance varies, of course, but this does not alter the fact that law enforcement is an extremely important domain.

To sum up, it can be said that the legal aspects of the changes taking place in Poland have been settled more or less 80 percent so far. If those missing implementing regulations are issued, we shall have a closed whole, as it were. That will leave only certain other domains to be settled from the legal point of view, as well as the aforementioned great task of adapting our laws to European laws.

[Chrupkowa] But there is no guarantee that this will happen. After all, we cannot preclude the possibility that the new parliament, and hence also the new government which it will appoint, might propose a vision of another Poland, which would inevitably entail an avalanche of new legislation.

[Respondent] But we have to assume that the present strategic option is neither fortuitous nor the handiwork of just one political force. Nearly all the significant political forces are in accord that Poland should be a European country equal to others in every domain. Thus, any eventual change in administration would merely modify rather than rescind the strategy.

[Chrupkowa] The quality of our laws is simply terrible. If for example we read the text of the law governing the social security of farmers, we feel completely frustrated. Is it possible to determine precisely the extent to which the government, being most often the initiator of new laws, is responsible for this law and the extent to which the parliament, on which ultimately everything depends, is responsible?

[Respondent] The responsibility is probably borne equally by both parties. This fatal situation will not change until collegial bodies begin to edit collectively the drafts of normative acts. The government is already abandoning the previous custom. At sessions of the Council of Ministers the directions of regulation are predetermined and decisions taken, while the editing of draft laws itself is entrusted to experts-legislators. As regards the parliament, on the other hand, the converse is true. Potentially every one of the 560 members of parliament is a lawmaker, and every one participates or may participate in revising draft laws, not always to good effect besides. Under such procedure it is easy to forget about the universal and inviolable canons of lawmaking and its institutional relationships. If these canons are not adhered to, the effect is precisely the laws that exist at present—often obscure and incoherent, to put it diplomatically. The time factor, haste, hardly contributes to deliberate, unhurried lawmaking, and this affects all those involved in the legislative process.

[Chrupkowa] I am wholly in agreement with this diagnosis, which manifests itself very eloquently in little scenes often observed in the parliament, such as disputes concerning some or other law provision or draft law, with one disputant telling the other, "Let us step offstage and take another look at that draft and revise it, and then vote on it." Such is the queer procedure whereby laws are made. How to get out of this quagmire?

[Respondent] It would suffice to abandon "the Polish road of lawmaking" and utilize the best experience of countries with parliamentary democracy. In those countries parliamentarians do not attend to improving or revising discrete articles of law. Instead, the parliament considers the essence of the law being proposed by the government and, if it is proper, supports it, and if improper, withholds its support. For example, if a draft law is two-thirds improper, it is returned to its framer, who revises and resubmits it, again and again, until it is ultimately either accepted or withdrawn. If the draft law concerns crucial issues, it even may involve a vote of confidence in the government.

Western parliaments evaluate draft laws chiefly from the social and political points of view, thus prejudging the direction in which a draft is substantively oriented. As for revising draft laws, that is handled by experts of law. In some countries there exist special law centers for this purpose.

In this country there is nothing like that as yet, and the proposal for establishing a law center, repeatedly offered by the chairman of the Legislative Council, has not yet been translated into reality.

[Chrupkowa] Let us also consider the chaos caused by the fact that at present laws are being drafted by just anyone, so that as many as three or five different drafts are submitted on the same subject, and that is when things begin to become messy.

[Respondent] That already is a matter for the Sejm. Quite often nobody asks the government for its opinion. It happens not infrequently that we learn from newspapers about the submission of draft laws by senators or deputies concerning subjects about which precisely the government would have a lot to say.

The law does not distinguish clearly between the domains in which legislative initiative belongs to the government and those in which it belongs to the Sejm and other bodies. At one time the ruling principle was that the government alone had legislative powers on matters ensuing from its competences, as it were, e.g., on economy or administration. Another unwritten rule was that, once some problem is regulated on the initiative of the government, it is the government that remains competent on the related issues. Now no such rules apply. And since the parliament is extremely busy, not that this is meant negatively, that is the reason for so many competing draft laws. We all should cooperate in creating new operating procedures and revising them, in particular in order to streamline lawmaking.

[Chrupkowa] A question that merits considering is, at what moment a draft law created by the government ceases to be a government draft law. For there exist instances of government draft laws whose text is revised by the Sejm so extensively that, as published in the Legislative Record, it no longer has anything in common with the text originally proposed by the government.

[Respondent] Sometimes we have the impression that the parliament mistrusts the government's ability to draft a well-considered and thought-out law. Perhaps we are to blame for failing to present a plausible rationale, or perhaps we are not sufficiently energetic in advocating our ideas. At any rate it appears that the government would be justified in withdrawing a draft law from submission to the Sejm if the Sejm's amendments of that draft are so extensive as to change its intent completely.

Another question that arises is whether the Sejm, though the supreme legislative body, indeed enjoys unlimited freedom and can pass any law whatsoever. It seems to me that the principle of the division of powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, a principle that we are translating into reality, should entail mutual restraint.

Therefore, the following issue should be extremely topical: should the Sejm be completely omnipotent? That is, should the government's role as regards legislation be reduced to an exclusively executive role? Recently we asked the Legislative Council some questions concerning the division of roles between the Sejm and the government. We are waiting for an answer, being aware that this still is a sensitive issue.

[Chrupkowa] Legislative arithmetic is simply a crying shame. Consider that a law may be amended twice but its text as amended the first time is promulgated later than as amended the second time. A law may be passed on 30 November, but it is dated 30 September. Such

mix-ups could be disregarded, since they would eventually be straightened out, were it not for their consequences which cannot be disregarded. For example, it is perplexing why the Sejm passed, say, on 24 January 1991 a law concerning war veterans, stipulating its effective date at 1 January 1991 without even specifying that it should be retroactive to that date as required by proper lawmaking procedures. The public will learn about that law at best in mid-March, because it was published in *DZIENNIK URZEDOWY* No. 17 on 4 March. The individuals whom this law affects are on tenterhooks; they are aware, because they read or heard somewhere, that this law, so important to them, is supposed to be effective since 1 January, but by mid-March no one yet has read its text. And at the same time a proposal...to amend that law has been offered in the Sejm. This is simply insane. Then also consider the sins of the Office of the Council of Ministers, which is obligated to print and publish all normative laws.

[Respondent] That is true, we have sinned in this respect, but that is now in the past. Today, owing to modern printing technologies, we can print and consign for distribution an entire issue within a day. But as for the delays at the Main Post Office near the Warsaw Freight Station, that is another matter and they bollix the whole thing.

We of course have no influence on the dates on which laws are to take effect, so you should address your queries on this topic to the Sejm, although we are aware of the pace at which the parliament is working. But as for the implementing regulations, which are up to us to issue, recently in general we have reduced to two weeks the interval of time needed to issue them.

Before the war laws used to take effect eight days from the date of their publication. There were no exceptions to that legal principle. Now the custom is that the publication date (that is, the date of *DZIENNIK USTAW*) is also the date on which a law takes effect, unless otherwise specified. That publication date is, by virtue of law, determined by the chairman of the Council of Ministers, because it is he who publishes the laws, but actually it is determined by the Legislative Office, and in reality by the printing plant. It is a lucky day when the printing plant completes the publication of a law on the eve of the date on which it is supposed to take effect.

In our opinion, the legislator himself should determine the effective date of a law, on allowing for the time needed by the Senate and the president, as well as for the time needed by the technological processes of printing. This would avert many misunderstandings.

**Government Approves Emergency Housing Law**  
*LD2404043191 Warsaw PAP in English 2203 GMT*  
23 Apr 91

[Text] Warsaw, April 23—The Council of Ministers accepted at its meeting today a new housing law and the act on emergency conditions of housing construction in

the years 1991-1995, also known as the Anticrisis Housing Act presented by Construction Minister Adam Glapinski whose idea was to lift formal barriers, simplify procedures, and give housing a chance.

Both documents will be carefully studied by an interministerial team that will pay attention to improving the social protection against the consequences of higher rents, and to improving the legal consistency of both regulations proposed. The government therefore asked the Sejm to delay the deadline on submission of both documents by May 15.

The council also opined on parliamentary draft amendments to the law on co-operatives. It said that the potential role of co-operative movement in the transformation of the Polish economy is not all utilized.

Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki briefed the ministers on the course and results of his visits to the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain, stressing their economic aspect.

In the context of his talks in Moscow Bielecki pointed out certain progress in the talks on the timetable of the Soviet Army's withdrawal from Poland, the status and rules according to which the divisions that will stay longer should pay their bills, bilateral trade, and signing the Polish-Soviet treaty.

Speaking of his visit to London, the prime minister emphasized a considerable growth of interest in Poland shown by Western business world.

The Council of Ministers acquainted themselves with a report on the negotiations concerning the reduction of the Polish debt. Government Plenipotentiary Janusz Sawicki gave an account on the effects of the agreement signed with the Paris Club on April 21, this year. Owing to the reduction, Poland will now pay installments of \$600 million every year instead of \$2 billion it would have had to pay each of the coming three years. At the end of 1994 Poland's debt with the Paris Club creditors is expected to be \$25-26 billion and not \$43 billion.

Poland will next negotiate with 17 creditors. Bilateral agreements are expected to be signed by October 31, this year. The talks will include discussion about the possibility for further reductions and about the conversion of the debt into local funds, such as environmental and social funds.

## ROMANIA

**Description, Analysis of Ceausescu Cadre Trial**  
*91BA0498A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA*  
*in Romanian 27 Mar 91 pp 1-2*

[Article by Geo Serban: "The Ever-Victorious Party Elite"]

[Text] What had become predictable after an interminable string of delays and grotesque legal procedures, has



come to pass. The so-called trial against former members of the Political Executive Committee in its latest composition exonerated most of them. Only a few received sentences, and those for very short terms and with amendments that seem to have been calculated to reduce to a minimum the idea that any sentence was pronounced. In the language of the master whom they all diligently served, "everything possible was done" to trivialize the guilt and repeal the responsibilities that the old or new party elite assumed when it accepted to scale the heights of power.

No one forced them to become decisionmaking factors and accomplices in criminal oppression, aside from their own inclinations and perseveringly pursued personal interests. The system had its own perverse criteria for cadre promotion, mostly calculated to stimulate servility, but it did not select its support pillars by force. The truth is that the candidates "elected" were vying with each other to "get into the picture," in other words to prove that they deserved to enter the leading clan, something that was implicitly followed by having one's portrait displayed and carried above the heads of the crowd at once huge demonstrations on 1 May and 23 August. Above their heads both at the parade and in daily life, thanks to a multitude of seductive privileges extended to spouses, issue, and sons- and daughters-in-law, who, to a person, were persuaded that they deserved to get everything in defiance of the precarious and devastating conditions prevailing below. The arrogant mentality thus cultivated could be read on their faces and their gestures, whether they were glimpsed seated in speeding limousines on reserved and well guarded lanes, or rigidly stuck like sphinxes in rigorously allocated armchairs in various presidiums. They always seemed to be carrying the weight of the world on their shoulders. So persuaded were they of the legitimacy of their place in the higher hierarchy, that they did not hesitate to deify the "boss" so that they, themselves, could share in the mysteries of immortality.

But now all of a sudden they pose as helpless, ignorant, misunderstood, and mistreated. ADEVARUL's envoy to the trial reported stunning reactions by the main characters in the box. One, who for years was in charge of propaganda in a spirit of miserable festivity, all the more assiduously kept up as the squalor grew and spread like a plague over the nation, and the author of the most extravagant formulas for exalting the personality cult, asked in the throes of amnesia: "I incited Ceausescu?" While another also tried to exonerate himself in the interrogative: "Did I have a choice about the system?" Evidently not! But he did have a choice about his behavior! How easily former potentates forget how they paid obeisance during "working visits," in the fields, drinking in recommendations as if they were mesmerized, and quickly writing them down in the ubiquitous pocket notebook. It was easy to guess with what zeal they would pass them on. But even assuming that they did not pass them on! As another defendant, one of the most veteran of the guard claimed about himself: "I did not pursue them..." he defended himself. Big deal, when many of the orders became inoperative either because of

their original stupidity or because they succeeded one another like an avalanche, so that today's orders canceled yesterday's. So in themselves the recommendations were not so bad. The core of the matter lies in the approving attitude emphasized by the diligent note-taking (some situations went beyond the ridiculous, because those who were busily taking notes at the presidium table were the same people who had prepared the speech that was being delivered on the podium) and the wildly enthusiastic applause that served to maintain the mad megalomania. Until not so long ago they were wearing their hands down applauding (and if they were faking it, prostitution is an aggravating circumstance), enthusiastically chanted "our esteem and pride" to the rhythm of tacitly tolerated amplifiers, were jostling each other to be close to Office No. 1 or 2, and were filled to burst with pride at the smallest sign that their obeisance had been accepted; and now all of a sudden the bag carrier himself, the most detestable of the daily watch hounds, stepped forward to express the depression of the suddenly exhausted team: "Pity the vanquished!" (see ADEVARUL 21 Mar 1991)

Vanquished? Let us be serious! Being taken off the list of the big banquet is not the end of the world. They should give thanks in chorus to whoever took care not to let their bones rot away in jail, where their clan used to send so many people accused without the right of appeal of not submitting to the crimes of the single party. Instead of insolently lamenting, they would do better not to provoke people to think more deeply about their case, lest anyone notice how the bitter observation is once again verified that "birds of a feather flock together." While in many respects the much trumpeted lifebuoy of "national salvation" is failing to lift the country out of the inherited misery, it seems to be useful and to work efficiently for the poor party elite that crashed down from the heights of totalitarianism. They will not be condemned to worry about the future. They are free to dream even of going to heaven, as long as enough of them are still pulling the ropes and making the decisions.

#### Education, Science Minister Stefan Interviewed

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in Romanian 21 Mar 91 p 4

[Interview with Education and Science Minister Gheorghe Stefan, by Della Verdes; place and date not given]

[Text] [Verdes] Many honorable Parliament members [MP's] in both houses have informed us that they were teachers. They have subjected you to repeated bombardments of questions. Do you think they are realistic?

[Stefan] Of course, each person asks questions at his own level. They cover the whole gamut, so to say, meaning from the most realistic to the most unrealistic. The term "realistic" may not be the most appropriate; let us say, "opportune." Some interpellations are nonsense.

[Verdes] At one point there was talk in Parliament of a no-confidence motion against you...



[Stefan] Yes, there was such talk. Actually, your newspaper carried a very precise note that alarmed my friends and family, though not myself, concerning that motion, to which the signatories were referring as if it were a fact. Actually a few MP's considered such a motion. They even gathered signatures, whose number kept changing because they kept going on the list, off the list... I do not know what it was all about and I was not interested.

[Verdes] Still, what was the reason for such an initiative? Were you really not interested?

[Stefan] No, I said I was not interested in the reason. I think it was sufficiently subjective for me not to be concerned about it. If the reasons had indeed been serious, obviously I would have been alerted. But, once again, I think the reasons were subjective.

[Verdes] How do you envisage the new structure of the Ministry of Education and Science [MES]?

[Stefan] Well, you know, the new structure is very different, especially with respect to preuniversity education, which takes up the biggest share of the ministry's activities in view of its diversity and the large number of students and teaching staff involved. Why? Because we must concern ourselves with three major issues: reorganizing the educational system, revising the curriculum, and improving the cadres. Those are the three major directions present in preuniversity education, which have their correspondence in three departments: Organization, Curriculum, and Improvement. There is also the Science Department, which is organized along specific activities. The situation is less spectacular with respect to university education. That is because we are giving the universities increasing autonomy, so ministerial coordination will gradually decrease.

[Verdes] The minister of culture several times said that approximately 80 percent of his Ministry employees are new. Was the MES "staffed" with new people to the same extent?

[Stefan] We had competitions for every ministerial post. Only some of the vacancies were occupied. Recently we had the second competition for the posts left empty after the first round. Of course there are lots of new people in the Ministry, but some of the old ones are still around. Currently about 75 percent of the employees are new and were hired by competition.

[Verdes] How do you explain the vehemence and rather large number of appeals generated by the first wave of competitions?

[Stefan] You have to realize who were the authors of the appeals: Generally they were either people who avoided signing up for the contests—Ministry employees who automatically left because they did not register—or people who registered but did not pass. That was the background. Still, this is our first such experience and it is absurd for anyone to expect things to go faultlessly from the first try. So, I agree that the contest conditions

can stand improvement. I do not have any illusions that all those who were now accepted are perfect, and better ones could not be found. No. Any decision carries a certain degree of efficiency which is never 100 percent. The main thing is that it should be over 50 percent, in other words that we should be right more often than wrong.

[Verdes] Naturally, the success of the idea of competition is very important. But if weaker candidates are accepted, the exact opposite occurs, namely the idea is discredited, which is much worse, do you not think so?

[Stefan] The main thing is not to judge the entire process on the basis of two-three isolated cases that keep being thrown in our faces. What I mean to say is that we tried to protect ourselves in the sense that people are hired for a six-months trial period. Only after that is one confirmed in position.

[Verdes] And what happens in these six months?

[Stefan] The Ministry leadership can observe the employees hired on the job and can make corrections. If some people do not turn out to meet the expectations, they are not definitively hired. We took this protective measure because we, too, realized that the contest method was not perfect. So, in six months time, around summer, we will be talking from different positions. Now this contest may not be a success from another viewpoint, namely that the best people may not become candidates. Much to my regret, I noted that currently very many good people are not getting involved. Either they refrain from joining the administration on the grounds that they have something better to do, which is fine; or they sit on the fence and watch what is happening as if it were a spectacle or a soccer game. I would have been happy if a larger number of intellectuals had indeed become involved in this work. But after all, working in the administration is not a great privilege at the moment: The pay is not of the most attractive, the work is intensive, and now there are other opportunities for making a living. Anyway, we are trying to maintain high standards and we are not obsessed with filling slots for its own sake.

[Verdes] What progress is being made in hammering out the new programs? You still do not have personnel for each discipline in your planning department. In this area you are getting expert assistance from the Institute of Education and Science. Is there not, or will there not be a duplication of competencies between the Ministry's research and planning department and the Institute?

[Stefan] No, because they do not work on parallel subjects, but cooperate.

[Verdes] So what are the duties of the Institute teams of researchers?

[Stefan] They deal with matters concerning the fundamentals of the educational process. They study them and

submit proposals. We draft more specific plans and concrete programs. Once they are ready, there will be a contest for actually writing the textbooks, which will be done by people outside the Ministry. Work on the programs must undoubtedly continue. We will publish them in TRIBUNA INVATAMINTULUI [Education Tribune]. We are trying to take measures so that a possible error at some point should not spread. Hence, all the programs will be published so that they can be discussed and even amended. Nothing is etched in stone at the moment.

[Verdes] What do you intend to do about the special schools? They continue to operate with teachers who are not experts, some of them nonprofessionals who automatically practice a vocation that requires both talent and special training.

[Stefan] That is the reason for which we wish to keep all the categories of schools under MES supervision, although some of them will thus be doubly answerable, namely to the MES and to another ministry or state secretariat. Why do we insist on this double supervision? Precisely because of the problem you mentioned, the problem of improved training. Because many people tend to stay in a certain place out of inertia even though they lack the necessary training. Now, the fact that a person wants to stay in his job can be something natural and we cannot be against it. But we can improve his performance. And if he does not want to improve, then we can suggest another job. That is why I think that the solution to this problem will come in time through a controlled and well-guided process of raising the professional level. This is the domain of the third direction I mentioned in connection with the preuniversity department.

[Verdes] Have any specific programs been worked out in this respect?

[Stefan] They are in the process of being drafted. We want to have an institution in charge of raising the professional level. Until now that was done in the universities and ended up being a kind of fifth wheel. In other words, teachers came up from schools and... "let us give them some classes." Most of the time it was the same classes they took at the university, which they were hearing again. It was positively embarrassing. Advanced training, however, must consist primarily of pedagogical reconditioning and refresher courses. Because if I get a math teacher I do not need to bring him up to date on the latest discoveries in math. That is not what he does with the children in school. I need to update him on the latest discoveries in the area of teaching math. After all, there are all kinds of techniques that can be applied in special schools, but none of our teachers know about them. Professional improvement must be a continual process, there is no other way, because the problems keep evolving. Other countries have extraordinary dynamics in this respect.

[Verdes] Have you visited any special school in Romania?

[Stefan] I have not visited any such school here, but abroad they actually parade their handicapped. They take extraordinary care of them; you see them everywhere, and that is actually one of the best therapies. Not like us, who have been keeping them hidden and are now talking about them only out of a sense of obligation. We still are not clear about what to do with these children. Abroad there is a trend to take them out of the environment of special schools and to integrate them in normal schools as much as possible. So, practically speaking, the purpose of such schools is that the students should leave them, provided their handicap is not very serious and can be attenuated. We must absorb all these pedagogical trends and experiments. The idea of open schools as alternative programs is being increasingly debated abroad and is one of the most prominent ideas in European pedagogical thinking. We must first change our perception of such children and then hope to obtain results in their recovery, even if partial.

[Verdes] Do you expect the new education bill to solve the thorny issue of minorities' education, especially of Hungarian language education?

[Stefan] This problem is in a way acute, not from the viewpoint of the contents of education, but because various political forces in the country are politically involved in it. Political cards are still being played on the education court. Very much so. This is something I do not agree with. Because if we were to examine the rights of the minorities in Romania we would find out that from this viewpoint the educational system in Romania is excessively liberal. Currently in Romania the minorities are obligated to study only Romanian. Under most constitutions in the world, up to high school level the minorities are entitled to study only in their mother tongue. And those constitutions are considered very liberal. Why did problems emerge? And where do we discern political involvement? The demands did not concern the curriculum of minority education, but its organization. Here I want to make a very clear distinction between curriculum and organization. Organization is not an issue that should be settled from the perspective of ethnicity. It has to do with entirely different principles. While international regulations—which I observe more than carefully—obligate me to have a certain curriculum, they do not obligate me to any form of organization. The methods of organization should not disrupt the social context. So we have to make this distinction; so far it has not been made and the issues have been mixed up. Because we do not organize our educational system according to the wishes of some categories on either side... Some people criticize the fact that there are schools with Hungarian classes and Romanian classes. No one cares whether the material they teach is correct, but everyone cares whether there are both Romanians and Hungarians in the same building. To me that is not an essential issue. To me the essential is that the Hungarians should study what they need to

study as a separate ethnic group, and my obligation is to preserve and guarantee their ethnic and cultural preservation. That is what I have to do.

[Verdes] In areas inhabited mostly by Hungarians there is a tendency to use separate textbooks for the Romanian language. Those are the old high school textbooks used in Hungarian sections, which are simpler than the more sophisticated textbooks of the Romanian sections. So far this is only a trend. Will such a differentiation become the norm in the future?

[Stefan] The textbooks reflect the level of proficiency in the Romanian language in a given class. I suspect that this is the grounds on which this kind of differentiation is made. Hence I believe that the difference is indeed justified in the case of low grades. And while they fulfill their purpose in low grades, it means that as we advance in grade the difference is increasingly less justified, so I would say that the issue must be decided strictly in keeping with the actual situation in the field. Because there are, for example, areas in which children speak Romanian very well from the first grade, while in other areas they do not speak it too well. So we must proceed not from a generalized idea, but from the concrete situation. So, for the first grade we could have two kinds of material for the minorities according to area; for example, I think that the Hungarian minorities in Bucharest know Romanian very well. Those in Covasna and Harghita may know it less well. I am talking of a seven, eight, nine, maximum 10-year old child. Beyond the age of 10-12 all of them can be expected to be at more or less the same level thanks to school education, not as a result of the family situation. If by the age of 12 they do not all know it equally well, and I cannot give them the same textbook, that means that the school is not good and that it has not done its duty.

[Verdes] Since we talked about contests and Hungarian language education: The case of Mrs. Ilona Tulit created a stir in Covasna County. She passed the professional test in the contest for inspector positions, but she was still not hired for the job. The reason was that she said she was "fed up with Ministry recommendations." The UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] described your decision as unfounded and undemocratic, and the prefect of Covasna respectfully informed you that you had fostered tension among the people and your measure was illegal. Could you give us some details about the mechanism of this widely commented decision?

[Stefan] It is very simple. I imagine the Tulit case has been solved. A few days ago a delegation of principals from Covasna came to see me. They told me that people there were very unhappy about my decision and that there was unrest. I deduced that they did not understand what it was all about. I clearly told them that I can understand that in the heat of a discussion someone may get angry and say, "I am fed up with these precious recommendations!" But I think it is absolutely abnormal that a few days or a week later the person in question

should appear on television and say exactly the same thing. So it was no longer anger, because this was after some time had passed in which one could have quietly considered one's attitude. If a person does not wish to put up with the Ministry's guidelines, then they cannot work in education administration and we should do them a favor and transfer them to a teaching job. That was what the lady publicly declared, so I had to do her that favor, did I not? Order is still required in the administration, we are still in a situation in which the Ministry issues orders. If we get to the point where people publicly declare that they will not observe them, then it is chaos and we do not stand a chance. Wherever I will notice such attitudes I will be obligated to adopt the same attitude. I explained that to the prefect, to the inspector general, and now to this delegation from Covasna. They said they understood and I hope they can also make their colleagues understand this. There was something else, too, which is an important nuance. The discussion at the inspectorate ran along the lines of, "Here you go again with Ceausescu-type methods!" Under Ceausescu, too, three candidates had to be nominated for inspector general. That is where everything started. Mrs. Tulit was against three nominations. But you see, if we now do something that "resembles" this, it does not mean that the same thought is behind it. My objective was entirely different. I ask for proposals from the inspectorate, the prefect's office, and from the Ministry, here. If all the proposals converge toward a certain person, to me that is an important sign. So that is the mechanism. Anyway, I do not think that this issue of appointing inspectors general has been very correctly resolved at ministry level.

[Verdes] Interethnic tension has most often had education problems in the background. All kinds of commissions traveled to areas with a Hungarian majority to gather information "on the spot." Education Ministry advisers and MP's or government members had talks with both sides. Have you been following the results of these investigations? Are there any reports available? What do they say?

[Stefan] I have not received any explicit message from Parliament along this line. Indeed, the Ministry sent some commissions, too. The picture they brought back was unfortunately quite garbled. I receive this picture on at least two channels. You realize what these two channels are! And they clearly differ. I have been alerted on some situations, but without verification. Some situations are very obvious, but they are also very local in nature, so I cannot generalize from that. Unfortunately, I have to work with truncated information, sometimes too local and sometimes too general. The only certitude I have is that there is tension there. It would be very important for me to have precise information, but that is almost impossible. For that I would have to set up a system for monitoring the situation that currently would be more complex than the entire Ministry. I have to hope and wager that the political attitude of many people in this country will in time mature. The main thing is to

create a certain mood and achieve a certain relaxation of political passions. Political action must not be inhibited in the state; people must be allowed to fully express themselves politically. However, there are some sacred areas and one of them is education; the church may be another one. If I mutilate the school to match the present political situation and leave marks on children and young people, that will have repercussions in five to six years when the political situation will certainly be different. Why should I subject young people to useless and perhaps even distorting experiments?

The law will indeed allow us to put order in the educational system. But this order must consist of a nice and elegant play between what people take upon themselves to do and what we impose. To me the law is not important as a tool with which to tax certain behavior, but with which to gradually create in people's minds a certain concept of what education means. And only when everyone will have adopted this concept will the reform become real. So far it is only on paper.

#### **Supreme Court President Pop Interviewed**

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[Interview with Dr. Teofil Pop, president of Romania's Supreme Court of Justice, by Petre Mihai Bacanu; place and date not given]

[Text] [Bacanu] Mr. President, what are the conditions for achieving real, independent justice in Romania?

[Pop] One thing that has become axiomatic is that any judicial procedure is conducted within the framework, on the basis and through the implementation of a determined legislation. This means that the first condition for the judicial to fulfill its mission and really mete justice is that the law itself be just. This process involves two facets: On the one hand there is the repealing by abrogation of the unpopular and antidemocratic laws of the totalitarian system, and on the other hand, the drafting of new laws with a view to restoring suspended rights or creating conditions for the normal exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in a state of law. The second condition for having real justice is to correctly implement the law. At least two factors are decisive to ensure that the spirit and letter of the law are interpreted and applied as appropriately as possible. The first is an objective factor which stipulates the independence of the judge and his duty to obey only the law. In my view, the independent position of the judge presents two aspects. One is conceptually derived from the independence of the judicial as a separate power in the state and places the judge above any influence, pressure, or extreme interference designed to influence his decision. The second, which concerns the status of the judge, places him outside any means of being made responsible for his decisions or of having disciplinary or other measures taken against him for having pronounced or not pronounced a certain solution. The second factor on which

depends the correct application of the spirit and letter of the law is a subjective one and concerns the professional and moral qualities of the magistrates.

[Bacanu] What is the place of the Supreme Court within the judicial system in the state of law that we hope to build?

[Pop] The Supreme Court of Justice stands at the top of the pyramid of judicial bodies. Its main duties are to watch over the rigorous and uniform implementation of the law throughout the country by judging special appeals filed by the prosecutor general and ordinary appeals filed by the sides, ensuring the legal operation of all our state activities by guaranteeing the rule of law and justice, and ruling out abuse and arbitrariness so as to make room for protecting the individual, his dignity, and his freedom. Consequently, within this framework, the Supreme Court of Justice, with the authority that it must carry in a state of law, exercises a regulating role in the interpretation and application of the law in specific cases brought before the court for judgment.

[Bacanu] What criteria were used to appoint the Supreme Court justices?

[Pop] First there was a rigorous selection of the justices who were kept on in the Supreme Court while the candidates for retirement were pensioned off. The second aspect, in conjunction or independently of the first, was aimed at manning the Supreme Court with judges of a certain professional and moral stature. Thus, after the 20 May 1990 election, the provisions of Decree Law No. 92/1990 were implemented, and Supreme Court members were appointed from among the magistrates with the highest professional credentials and faultless morality in the entire country. That occurrence constitutes a guarantee for raising the quality of the act of justice and ensuring that all the decisions are just and serve to protect the democratic rights and freedoms of all the citizens. One symptomatic fact was that only eight of the 41 Supreme Court justices were maintained from the old group for their professional probity; seven justices were promoted from provincial courts, something that was a novelty after the totalitarian regime. Also noteworthy is the fact that seven Supreme Court magistrates have doctorates or are studying for a doctorate in law.

[Bacanu] Before the Revolution, what were the criteria for selecting Supreme Court justices and generally for promoting judges in every instance?

[Pop] I cannot separate between the situation and status of court and tribunal cadres and that of the cadres in the former Supreme Court, because the criteria for recruiting and promoting judges were the same: "social background" and "devotion to the communist regime." Only after that came the criterion of professional level, which was applied only if cadres with a "healthy social background" were not to be found. Fortunately for the judicial—because otherwise this institution with its specific prerogatives would have been doomed to perish—in some lucky situations the same judge did meet two

criteria, namely good social background and special professional qualities. As for the justices of the former Supreme Court, it may be interesting to note that they were selected by the Grand National Assembly only after the candidate was accepted by the Promotion Commission of the former PCR [Romanian Communist Party] Central Committee. After the Revolution the activities of the Justice Ministry have been consistently measured by a single criterion, namely caliber. However, since the judicial had to enjoy a high reputation, the moral traits of those slated to ensure and preserve this reputation could not be ignored, beginning with honesty. I want to publicly express my view that Romania has a select body of magistrates capable of guaranteeing progress in the Romanian judicial system.

[Bacanu] Our newspaper itself carried comments on some Supreme Court appointments, including some incorrect information about several magistrates. We have a moral obligation to establish the truth about the persons in question.

[Pop] Unfortunately, your newspaper allowed space for articles about Supreme Court justices that contained unfounded statements. I want to mention only one article, "The Migration of Activists," of 8 February 1991, which featured a number of incorrect statements. Thus, it stated that Supreme Court Justice Gheorghe Uglean was a member of the Dolj County Party Bureau. That was a flagrant untruth. Dr. Uglean was never a member of the county party committee nor of the county bureau. After the Revolution Mr. Uglean was appointed president of the Dolj County Tribunal and in July 1990 he was promoted Supreme Court justice. The same article also stated that Justice Dr. Leonida Pastor was "president of the Timisoara Court" under the totalitarian regime. Not true. Mr. Leonida Pastor was never a court president in Timisoara. After the Revolution he was promoted president of the Timis County Tribunal and then Supreme Court justice. Another incorrect statement: Judge Costica Ionescu was [reportedly] a member of the Ialomita County Party Bureau. Mr. Ionescu never held that position. As president of the Ialomita County Tribunal it is true that, by virtue of his position, he was a member of the county party committee, but never of the bureau. I also want to mention that the article insinuated that Supreme Court Justices Anton Pandrea, Gheorghe Bucur, and Elena Osipenco had allegedly been secretaries of the party organization of the Bucharest Municipal Tribunal. Incorrect: Those judges never held that political position. All the above mentioned magistrates, deliberately denigrated by your newspaper—because after we called its attention to the errors it published the same article in INDEPENDENTUL—are among the best judges in Romania with the highest level of professionalism and a distinguished professional and moral reputation.

[Bacanu] Do you think that currently the judges are completely independent?

[Bacanu] The answer is in principle positive. A series of measures were taken after the Revolution to ensure complete independence for judges. First of all, the judicial system began to be reorganized; a process of moral and professional purge began, whereby magistrates devoted to the old structures were released and the courts were staffed with personnel of undeniable professional quality and indubitable moral integrity. Secondly, under Decree Law No. 140/1990 appropriate material conditions were secured for the judges to provide them with the economic independence necessary to fulfill the natural status of a magistrate. All these measures were aimed at creating the organizational and economic framework and the moral and professional climate required to ensure the normal operation of judicial instances, so that the judicial system can regain and preserve the prestige that it must command. Nevertheless, another element has to be added in order to achieve complete and genuine independence for judges in a state of law, namely tenure for judges. Tenure is nothing but the prerogative of judges not to be transferred, replaced, or released from position, except for committing serious disciplinary violations or criminal acts, certainly not because of the decisions pronounced. This is the reason that, in our opinion, judges are currently independent only in principle.

Consequently, Parliament is duty-bound to hasten the adoption of the law on judicial organization and the law on the organization and operation of the Supreme Court with a view to legislating tenure for judges and thus achieving de facto independence for magistrates.

[Bacanu] Do you trust that in the future it will be one of the three powers in our state?

[Pop] I am fully confident. Indeed, the principle of separation between the legislative, executive, and judicial powers proclaimed in the first document of the December 1989 Revolution and consolidated under the Decree Law No. 92/1990, which will also be sanctioned in the country's future Constitution, will definitively restore its legitimate rights to the judicial power, which the former dictatorship trivialized both in theory and in practice. Conceptually, the independence of the judicial is ensured by the principle of separation of powers in the state. However, real independence must rest on certain guarantees, and thus the new Constitution will have to prominently feature the principle of independent judges and restore the principle of tenure for them, both of which will consolidate the legal foundation of a stable and real judicial power. The judicial power must have its own statute and must be the only one entitled to apply the law, carry out the act of justice, and watch over the observance of the law.

[Bacanu] Mr. President, I want to ask you a rather uncomfortable question. There has been a lot of talk about the implementation of the law on collective labor

disputes in the case of the railway workers' strike. There is no doubt that a law must be observed. Nevertheless, do you not think it symptomatic that the law was published in MONITORUL OFICIAL on the very same day on which it was promulgated, considering the delay with which laws normally appear in MONITORUL OFICIAL?

[Pop] I have to admit that the haste with which the law on collective labor disputes was voted, promulgated, and published, has rarely been used in parliamentary practice. No less true is the fact that the enormous damages produced in the national economy and the imminent economic disaster caused by the strike of the railway workers in Iasi and Timisoara were the reason for the rapid enactment of the law on collective labor disputes. If you had been in the shoes of the government and Parliament, what would you have done?

[Pop] I want to inform the public that I approved that draft bill in March or April when I was serving as minister of justice and that it was debated by the CPUN [Provisional National Unity Council], but it was postponed on the grounds that the law in question was too important not to be passed by the future legitimate parliament, given the people's investiture in the wake of elections. I have noticed that the current bill on collective labor conflicts is almost identical with the draft discussed by the CPUN, so Parliament could have voted that draft long before it did.

Once the law came into effect on 11 February 1991 it had to be unconditionally observed by the strikers, as well as the Supreme Court decision which suspended the continuation of the strike. In my lengthy career I never saw a Supreme Court decision not respected. There seems to be some confusion between democracy and anarchy.

In a state of law final court decisions must be respected and implemented by all state authorities: the country's president, the government, parliament, local administration, and by the citizenry; anything else is a negation of the state of law and leads to social chaos and anarchy.

While the position of the trade union leaders of the Local Railway Authorities of Iasi and Timis not to obey the Supreme Court decision was below criticism and the responsible bodies should have taken disciplinary, pecuniary, or even penal measures against those leaders, the same can be said of the government, which did not observe the decision in question, because next day it sat down to negotiate. The government should have ruled that first the trade unions were to obey the court decision to suspend the strikes and go back to work, and then they could conduct negotiations, because the sides had 60 days to do so. I have the deepest respect and consideration for Minister of State Aurel Stoica, who showed special moral and professional probity and resigned because the government forced him to negotiate with the strikers in defiance of the law and the Supreme Court's decision.

[Bacanu] What was the reason that you set the date for adjudicating the requests to suspend the railway strikers' strikes in Iasi and Timisoara for 15 February, although the requests were filed on 13 February?

[Pop] Because of the need to observe the emergency trial procedure. Article 31 of the law on collective labor disputes envisages a seven day period for ruling on cases. Since the Civil Procedure Code allows the president to shorten the five-day period required to deliver subpoenas, I shortened it to one day (three days in reality, because the period is calculated in full days) and took measures so that the subpoenas be handed to the trade union leaders on 13 February, which is what happened. The purpose of the law was fulfilled, the trade union leaders were aware of the trial date, and the files contained proof that the procedure had been followed.

We decided on such a short term after taking a margin of safety in case on 15 February the trade unions had demanded a postponement in order to hire a lawyer or procure evidence. In fact, the Civilian Code allows the court president to conduct the ruling without citing the sides in certain urgent cases. Although the law on labor disputes envisaged an urgent ruling procedure (seven days), I thought that there was no need to sacrifice a trial principle, namely the obligation to inform the sides about the trial, and that is why I ordered that the trade unions be cited for the adjudication of the case.

#### Peasant Party Leader Coposu Interviewed

91BA0490A Bucharest "22" in Romanian  
22 Mar 91 pp 8-9

[Interview with National Peasant Party Leader Corneliu Coposu by Andreea Pora on 11 March; place not given]

[Text] [Pora] Was the emergence in December 1990 of the National Convention for the Establishment of Democracy the outcome of the social tensions prevailing at the time, or of a prior strategy?

[Coposu] It was an older strategy. In the course of one year of activities of the pseudo-parliament called CPUN [Provisional National Unity Council] and of the present Parliament, which we view as nonrepresentative and illegal, it was noted that the parliamentary opposition, which should have been a constructive opposition helping to hammer out laws appropriate to the national requirements, has become completely ineffective. The political power forced the issue and achieved an embarrassing result at its expense, securing a comfortable majority that operates like a ballot machine and blocks absolutely all of the opposition's moves without even filtering their contents. That is the reason that the government's projects cannot be amended. The role of the opposition is thus distorted.

[Pora] In this situation, what exactly did you hope to achieve through the December coalition and more importantly, by what means?

[Coposu] We formed the convention in order to try to make a greater contribution to improving the situation in Romania by uniting the parliamentary and extraparliamentary opposition. Unfortunately, the government showed itself incapable of meeting the country's economic, political, and social needs. The only purpose of a united opposition was to serve the interests of the nation which is now at a serious impasse for which no solutions are in the offing.

[Pora] As we talk now, more than two months since its establishment, do you think that those objectives have been attained at least partially, or did the convention in fact turn out to have been useless?

[Coposu] It has established a system of coordinating actions. From that viewpoint it has honored its pledge, in the sense that joint decisions were taken at important points in the political life.

[Pora] Can you give me an example?

[Coposu] Today, in fact, we jointly decided not to attend a meeting to which the opposition was invited by Mr. Iliescu.

[Pora] Contrary to what you tell me about perfect unity, recently the MER [Ecology Movement of Romania] withdrew from the convention in the belief that the political circumstances that generated it had passed and that its mission had ended.

[Coposu] The reason given by MER is not serious. The purpose of the convention was not to bring about Romania's access to the European Council as a special guest, but, as we decided, its purpose was to establish democracy. And no one can claim that democracy exists, on the contrary, the remnants of it and the fragile beginning of democratic institutions are in danger. So this was a pretext for withdrawing.

[Pora] What would be the real reasons?

[Coposu] We do not really care, but they probably intended to cooperate with the authorities and to avail themselves of an opportunity to enter into some agreement without being hampered by any obligations stemming from participation in the convention.

[Pora] The leaders of the PNL [National Liberal Party] had a separate meeting with Mr. Iliescu in December, at which they requested the formation of a national unity government. The convention expressed disapproval of that request. Why?

[Coposu] The parties preserved complete freedom of political strategy and tactics. Their doctrine and ideology were of course not in the least affected. The PNL requests predated the convention and were made solely in the name of that party.

[Pora] Did you know that they were going to make those requests?

[Coposu] No, I did not.

[Pora] Still, some PNL members claim that you were informed four hours before the call to Cotroceni [Palace].

[Coposu] No, the party leadership informed us only after the talk it had with the president.

[Pora] Did you think the request opportune?

[Coposu] No, my viewpoint does not coincide nor does it have to coincide with those of other parties. Each one is free to keep its own views. Participation in the convention was aimed at achieving understanding on the basis of a minimum platform designed to block the downslide to a new totalitarianism. Only after democratic institutions have been guaranteed, thus permitting the unfolding of a constitutional mechanism, can competition among political parties begin.

[Pora] Should I understand from that that you will change your strategy at the next elections?

[Coposu] I think that beginning with the coming local administrative elections, the united opposition must run on only one list. It may possibly be supported by associations, leagues, and alliances, i.e., by all the groups whose objective is to struggle against communism in disguise.

[Pora] Have you taken steps along this line, have you been in contact with the Civic Alliance, for example, or with the Antitotalitarian Fora?

[Coposu] It is still premature. I doubt, however, that administrative elections will be held, because if the government had such an intention it would not have changed the law and replaced one provisional structure by another provisional structure so as to avoid elections. In fact, this utterly surprising law was used by the representatives of the authorities to place their trusted men in political structures.

[Pora] What mistakes do you think the opposition is currently making?

[Coposu] It cannot even make mistakes, it can only suffer those of the authorities. The opposition cannot even indirectly make government mistakes because it is completely left out of executive and legislative decisions.

[Pora] I was thinking mostly of tactical and diplomatic mistakes.

[Coposu] In that respect, there is room to discuss whether some of the measures taken were optimal or susceptible to criticism.

[Pora] Increasingly more voices claim that the opposition should pull out of Parliament, because its inefficiency only plays in the hands of the authorities. Have you discussed such an alternative?



[Coposu] I fully agree about its inefficiency in Parliament. That is because the majority does not allow any amendment to its own projects. Of course, in these conditions any intervention is good only for the record. As for pulling out, our party leadership took a decision in principle by which it agreed to do so at the right moment.

[Pora] What would be the right moment? What would have to happen?

[Coposu] Something very serious, of course, because that is our utmost measure. In order to have an impact on public opinion it must be carried out in block. It is not enough that one party withdraw. In my opinion, that ultimate gesture will be made, if things continue the way they are, as a form of protest against the autocratic tendencies of the authorities.

[Pora] If you were in a position to take over in the next few months, could you come up with a program, a government team, and leaders capable of dealing with the current socioeconomic situation?

[Coposu] I want to make a remark concerning the introduction of the term "leader" in the political lexicon. I have seen various articles which examined even the means of creating a leader. I do not think that leaders are necessary. What we need are level-headed, wise, and thoroughly trained professionals who can contribute to the measures indispensably needed to pull the country out of the impasse.

[Pora] Nevertheless, on 20 May people voted for a leader, for Mr. Ion Iliescu, rather than for a party...

[Coposu] At first sight that would seem to have been the case. But if we analyze the election, we cannot ignore the atmosphere in which the electoral campaign was held. The parties were actually prevented from making contact with the public. Aside from the fact that they lacked sufficient material resources, they were continually hunted, pestered, and threatened through campaigns of violence and disinformation. Our party suffered two deaths, 168 serious injuries, over 4,000 people mistreated, and 167 offices ransacked. The election was more like a civil war. And then came the frauds.

[Pora] What guarantee do you have that those events will not be repeated and what measures have you taken to preempt that?

[Coposu] We are working precisely in that direction. The only method is to persuade the public of the need to establish democratic institutions. Otherwise we will remain under the oppression of a dictatorial oligarchy.

[Pora] What do you think, has your support among the masses increased, especially in the rural environment?

[Coposu] People still suffer from political timidity and they are still terrified. There have been unimaginable threats and acts of violence in the country to the point of having children maimed and houses set on fire. Since fall

there has been a change in attitude and an increasing number of peasants have been turning to our party.

[Pora] Recently you have been severely attacked by Vatra Romaneasca. Does it constitute a real danger to the PNT-cd [National Peasant Christian Democratic Party]?

[Coposu] I cannot deny Vatra's proclivity to polarize certain sympathies by exacerbating patriotic feelings. In Transylvania there have been periods of confrontation between ethnic Romanians and Hungarians, but they ended without consequences. It is only natural that people, especially those who are not well informed, should live with the obsession of the threat of dismemberment of the country. Such alleged threats—because I contest their existence—have been exploited as electoral capital. This was a disloyal act [of competition], but I do not know to what extent the indirect statement implied in your question can be verified in practice. I believe in the future of a united Europe without frontiers. We should present ourselves to the world as a civilized nation free of xenophobic and chauvinistic leanings.

[Pora] Do you believe that the party needs to be reinvigorated?

[Coposu] That is what we are trying to do by promoting young elements, and that is an action that has been underway for a while. The restructuring conducted in August was aimed at integrating a large number of young people in the party leadership. Aside from the generation that revived the party—a generation made up of survivors of communist jails and gulags—there has been an interim generation that has not had the opportunity to engage in politics, and a young generation born and raised under communism. This generation became integrated in the party and must take its place in the leadership and learn the practices of democratic institutions.

[Pora] Countless times the PNT-cd has been accused of aggravated radicalism. To some, this was a reason to trust it, because it eliminated any suspicion of a possible pact with the authorities, but at the same time it also contributed to losing support. Could a moderate, PNL-type attitude have brought you more gains?

[Coposu] We are not the partisans of moderate attitudes. The political intransigence of our party was perfidiously exploited for the purpose of scaring off certain categories that saw their future threatened. However, from the very beginning we pointed out that we struggled against communism, not against communists. The best proof of that is that we opened up the doors to former PCR members, who must not be dismissed, but must be integrated in the social and political life. We went even further and announced that we had nothing against people who belonged to repressive structures but who did not commit excesses.



[Pora] What you tell me is surprising. How can you verify such excesses? On the other hand, does not this facilitate infiltrations?

[Coposu] We did not view them as infiltrations. The whole problem is reduced to distinguishing between guilty people, party or Securitate members who committed crimes or abuses against the population, and mere carriers of party cards. We do not view the latter as guilty. Some of them did have ambitions and tried to assert themselves through political means. But they were not very guilty either, if their activities did not include negative aspects with consequences for the public.

[Pora] On the basis of what data can you assess the activities of such members, or more precisely, did you have such data?

[Coposu] This aspect is not essential to us. There have been cases of people who joined the party and where then identified as having committed reprehensible acts; they were ousted from the party. But I do not think that we need to filter every membership application. We can consider everyone honest until proven otherwise; we cannot impose humiliating conditions through which to sieve all applicants.

[Pora] Are you not afraid that after reading your statement in the magazine, old and new, honest or evil Securitate members will line up to join the PNT-cd? Do you not thus run the risk of being undermined from inside your own party?

[Coposu] Many Securitate members have probably already joined. But undermining is difficult. I do not deny that we, too, have been infiltrated. But since we have nothing to hide, do not work in illegal conditions, do not plan coups or any activities that could in any way interfere with state security or with the country's stability, we can be very open. We did not make an even perfunctory search for the microphones that no doubt have been installed in all our offices. We do not care because we have nothing to hide.

[Pora] Mr. Ilie Paunescu (editor in chief of EPOCA) said in an interview for Radio Free Europe that three weeks ago President Iliescu invited the opposition parties to a meeting to discuss the formation of a coalition government. What can you tell me about this event?

[Coposu] I can categorically state that we did not receive any official invitation of this kind.

[Pora] Could not this be one of the purposes of the meeting to which you are invited tomorrow?

[Coposu] We do not know anything about the nature of this invitation because we were simply not told.

[Pora] What were the reasons for the refusal to attend, to which the entire convention subscribed?

[Coposu] I cannot tell what the reasons were, because I do not know what the reasons were for the invitation.

For such a proposal to elicit a response and to be accepted it must have an objective. I am asking you over to discuss a certain matter. If I agree to discuss it, I will go. But if the invitation is formal, along the lines of, come over here to appear together on film and to show the foreigners that there is agreement between the political power and the opposition, it has no sense.

[Pora] How will you react to a possible rift in the Front?

[Coposu] So far the differences occurring within the Front are of no significance to us.

### Summary, Analysis of Fratia News Conference

91BA0496A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA  
in Romanian 27 Mar 91 p 3

[Article by Doina Doru-Chirca detailing news conference held on 21 March by the Fratia Trade Union Confederation in Bucharest]

[Text] A news conference was held last Thursday at the headquarters of the Fratia Confederation, at which the latter presented its position on price liberalization, on Mr. I.A. Stoica's statements at the FSN [National Salvation Front] Convention, and on a number of trade union bills. Concerning the price liberalization we learned that Fratia's viewpoint coincides to what many of us believe, namely that it was in fact a price hike, because we have neither the mechanisms of a genuine market economy nor competition, and because the demand is far greater than the supply. About Mr. Ion Aurel Stoica we heard only good things; the view expressed was that he was the only one who envisaged real social protection, as opposed to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection which did nothing. About the fact that the unemployment bill covers only school graduates over 18, while in practice many youths leave the educational system at 16 and they have a right to work but no jobs, Mr. Miron Mitrea explained to us that this particular viewpoint was accepted on the basis of Western experience in the matter, namely that if young people know that they can receive unemployment relief (it is only for six months, not a lifetime), that encourages them to be lazy and not study! That is an odd viewpoint for a trade union; so, up to the age of 18, unless they pass tests at some school, unemployed youths will live at the expense of their parents. Some of them will join the ranks of the delinquents.

As for the income tax bill, more specifically the tax on overtime, Fratia stated that it agreed with the law and that the trade unions were obligated to discourage "overtime" in the hope that more workers can thus be employed thanks to better organization and in order to force employers to possibly hire sufficient personnel so as not to exceed the daily eight hours. The reasoning is partially correct. Nevertheless, there are still the continuous-process industry (metallurgy, cement, food, etc.) where work must continue on Saturday and Sunday, but because of the income tax system, the workers will lose rather than gain for their efforts. The reply evaded this

aspect of the question. We also learned that one of the confederation's initiatives is to sanction in the Constitution a third house of parliament made up of specialists and trade unionists (as well as women's organizations, retirees, etc.), a proposal that is also supported by the president. Fratia also suggested a social security system established on the basis of credit from UGSR [Union of Romanian General Trade Unions] funds which are currently frozen. Some of the responsibility for that rests with the FSN, which opposed the distribution of the trade unions' wealth "in the desire to have a docile trade union movement." It was suggested that these funds be put in the care of Parliament.

A peculiar, if not downright murky idea, was expressed both about the institution of the presidency and the monarchy. Thus, the confederation allegedly asked the president to "become involved in order to set himself apart from the king (?) and to govern, rather than rule." Should he perhaps take the place of the government? Because after all, only the government should be involved; the president is only a mediator. Otherwise we will be back where we started from, because the late president used to thoroughly "involve" himself in growing corn, irrigation, metallurgy, research, and so forth...

As for the recent meeting held by the Alfa Cartel, Fratia's leader said that they could not join it because Alfa supported the Cojocaru alternative, viewed as "cheap populism." Moreover, without proffering any threats, Mr. Mitrea said that they will take to the streets only when social security is not ensured for the people. Should we understand from that that currently social security is ensured?! Then what about the assertion that city halls (including Bucharest's) still have not organized labor exchanges and there is no sign of training classes before the lapse of the legal three years? In fact, with disarming honesty Mr. Mitrea admitted that they did not spot the dangers in the unemployment bill concerning the terms for establishing retraining centers (three years from now on, in which time the bureaucracy will move at its specific snail pace while the workers sit on their hands!).

One interesting proposal was made about adopting flexible "schedules" for cutting down personnel. One of the criteria of course will be competence. Another, however, is whether one owns land, because people who have land have some source of revenue. Such a provision is featured in the unemployment bill, but only in connection with the payment of unemployment relief, not with discrimination on the job. We were surprised not to hear any mention of how easily various human rights are violated (the right to work without discrimination, the right to own property, the possibility of having several sources of income, etc.), let alone concrete and immediate issues such as, for example, that a person may own a plot of land but no house in a given locality, but unless

the person has a job—and thus a source of income—how can he build on it, purchase equipment, etc.?

From the various addresses two trends clearly stood out: one for a vote of no-confidence in the government (but not against Mr. Roman), and one for a vote of confidence in the president. Various excuses were found for the latter along the line of, "his intentions are good, he has a lot of understanding, but he is not well informed," while "advisers graduated from Stefan Gheorghiu chase after political profit and foster intrigues." The effect was the opposite of that intended, since the impression created was one of incompetence. Because while the man in the street may not be informed (and be forgiven for it) and while the citizen Iliescu may have that right, the country's president does not. He was elected president precisely in order to keep informed and to select competent and reliable advisers. And if the latter are "political profiteers," that is the fault of the person who selected them as advisers and who should thus suffer the consequences. It is not the citizen's fault that X or Y is deliberately misinforming the president (although, thank God, "a certain category of the press" is keeping him fully informed, but perhaps he does not read it?!). He who chose badly should perhaps admit it and punish the impostors?

A torrent of accusations were leveled at the government for evading the obligation of social protection by claiming that it does not have money and generally for being made up of theoreticians rather than practitioners. The reform was viewed as good in theory, but in practice the view expressed was that the former nomenklatura is implementing a "wild liberalism" in the hope either that the old times will return or in order to make as much profit from the new order by concentrating the financial reins in their own hands. Along this line Fratia suggested the establishment of a national commission (the how many-eth, we wonder?) to monitor the implementation of the reform. But who's fault is it that the bureaucratic "apparatus" that prevents or distorts the reform is still in place? The answer was clear-cut: the government and the prime minister. Even Mr. Iliescu himself reportedly complained that obstacles are being raised in some departments. So what do we do, watch the president, the government, and the trade unions cry on each other's shoulder while the country sinks deeper into disaster? The conclusions are obvious but it seems that no one wants to see them. Everyone shouts that because of Mafia-type interests, projects are blocked, profitable offers are turned down, and lines of credit are not used, but that must be the citizens' fault, since no one cares to get to the heart of the matter, remove those who are incompetent, and deblock business.

To sum up, although Fratia claims to be a "radical" and "restless" trade union and although there was a lot of talk, our impression was that Fratia is far from being a Solidarity-type trade union, which is what we had hoped.

## YUGOSLAVIA

**Implementation of Land Return Law Discussed**

91BA0500A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian  
2 Apr 91 p 13

[Article by A. Cubrilo-Kosovac: "Following Enactment of Law in Serbian Assembly: Return of Land to Farmers Begins"—first paragraph is POLITIKA introduction]

[Text] The term for ruling on claims in 30 days. Decisions are in the hands of special commissions. If there are problems with the payment of restitution, the republic will assume all obligations. An opportunity for young people to return to rural areas.

Several days ago—on 27 March, to be exact—the Assembly of Serbia enacted a law on the return of dispossessed farmland to its previous owners. The law was deemed a significant, but at the same time only an initial step in the remaining, more sweeping, and conceptually different process of regulating relations of ownership law. In particular, the establishment of a unified, genuinely legal regime for all forms of ownership while safeguarding the legal security of owners. This, it is believed, would result in greater material interest in the production-oriented commitment, as well as other forms of commitment, of personal property.

The just-enacted law on the return of dispossessed farmland to its previous owners will contribute to these intentions, and we asked Branko Pavicevic, the director of the Republican Administration for Property-Rights Affairs in the Ministry for Finance when this document will go into effect in practice.

**200,000 Hectares Will Be Returned**

According to the letter of the law published in SLUZBENI GLASNIK REPUBLIKE SRBIJE on 26 March, the return of land to farmers will begin in practice shortly. Moreover, a special regulation will also be adopted concerning implementation of the ordinance, although the work actually begins at the moment that the commission is appointed to rule on claims by owners for the return of land.

Thus, it is necessary that the assemblies of the opstinas get to work on proposing the makeup of these commissions as soon as possible, in order that the Ministry for Agriculture, as stipulated by the law, can decide on the appointment of the commissions. Moreover, they must comprise one judge, one agricultural specialist, one surveyor, and two deputies to the opstina assembly, as well as two town residents who are well-acquainted with circumstances in the village in question (but who have no decision-making rights). Because of the importance of the task of implementing the law, competence in the procedure is not granted to an executive administrative organ—the service for property-rights affairs—but rather to commissions specially formed for this purpose, explains Pavicevic.

The formation of the commissions, Pavicevic believes, can be completed in 20 days. In the meantime, citizens must enter their claims with the organs for property-rights affairs of their opstina, which according to the letter of the law will perform specialized and administrative work for the commission. The term for ruling on claims is 30 days from the moment that the initiative is submitted, and in cases where the situation is clear-cut, Branko Pavicevic feels, the work can be completed even more quickly.

The law, whose 18 articles regulate the return of 180,000 to 200,000 hectares of land, is moreover the first postwar ordinance in Serbia, as well as in Yugoslavia, to provide compensation to farmers, doing so, Pavicevic emphasizes, for land dispossessed in two ways: on the basis of the Law on the Farmland Fund of Social Ownership and on the Appropriation of Land to Agricultural Organizations and on the basis of ordinances on the compulsory delivery of grain enacted between 1946 and 1951.

The director of the Republican Administration for Property-Rights Affairs says that farmers will get back all land dispossessed in these two ways. The exception is urban construction land as well as land on which structures of a permanent character have been erected whose value exceeds the value of the land itself. This also applies to land on which permanent plantings have been established on land greater than three hectares, but only in the period of time when they are in full yield, up to 15 years in age (when they are regarded as depreciated).

**Confirmation of Law in Practice**

Pavicevic emphasizes that it is essential that only land that is under social ownership be returned.

Asked what will happen if a combine, cooperative, or opstina is not able to pay restitution for the land (in cases where there is not enough land to return), Pavicevic says that in that case the republic will assume the obligation to pay restitution.

It is believed that there will not be too many cooperatives that will be forced to shut down by the land return measures. This is because according to statistics, only 12 to 14 percent of the total holdings of combines and agricultural cooperatives comprise land that must be returned to its previous owners according to the letter of the just-enacted law. However, Pavicevic says, it is true that in some cases the law will nevertheless "drain" a cooperative's entire monetary reserves. In that case, the cooperatives will share the fate of enterprises that are going bankrupt. The solution, our interlocutor says, is for the erstwhile "owners" of the land—the cooperatives—to lease this same land from the farmers and to survive in this way, provided that the farmers are interested in this type of cooperation.

It will not be possible to genuinely talk about results of the just-legalized measures for another year or two, Pavicevic feels. Until then, practical steps will be taken to confirm the intentions of the legislature to promote

and accelerate agricultural production by returning land to its original owners and creating larger land holdings—not only through greater opportunities to apply measures of agricultural engineering, but also through keeping young people in the fields and, if possible, having them return there. This migration will be stimulated by various legal instruments, including tax measures. For example, neglect of cultivable land in the future will be subject to stiffer penalties. It is believed that herein lies the chance for greater momentum by private initiative in this area as well.

[Box, p 13]

#### Remarks From Public Debate

During the two months of public debate, in which around 30,000 citizens participated—as many as 700 actively—demands for the return of land based on the two aforementioned principles were heard in all 20 cities of Serbia, without exception, even if only as a link in the chain of returning real estate in general. Especially emphatic were the demands for the return of real estate dispossessed through implementation of ordinances on agrarian reform and colonization.

Noting why these demands could not be complied with in the drafting of the law, Pavicevic explains that the agrarian reform is a federal ordinance that was not reconciled with the country's highest laws upon adoption of the country's 1974 Constitution, for the simple reason that it was proclaimed a "historic" law that, as such, did not have to be reconciled with the Constitution. This was also the reason that Serbia did not have the authority to change provisions of the ordinance on agrarian reform and to regulate that subject area through its law.

In addition, the implementation of agrarian reform in individual parts and regions of Serbia (as well as Yugoslavia) led to changes in the structure of the population. The colonized population became the legal owners of nationalized land. Tampering with such established situations today would be hard to carry out, Pavicevic feels. The legal security of the citizens would be thrown into disorder, which is the decisive and logical reason that agrarian reform was not included as a basis for the return of land.

The 1946 Law on Private Economic Enterprises and Stores, through which owners were dispossessed of factories, stores, mills, etc., is also federal in character and is not reconciled with the country's Constitution, and thus not with the republic's Constitution either. This also applies to the 1958 Law on the Nationalization of Rental Housing Property, Housing Units, and Construction Land. Both documents, on the federal level, are regarded as historic, executed by laws of a permanent character. This position is a specific consequence of the former opinion that privatization will never take place, and that questions of this nature cannot be decided on by each republic in its own manner.

#### Census Seen as Tool for Ethnic Power

91BA0508A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 2 Apr 91  
pp 22-23

[Article by Jovo Paripovic and Fahrudin Radoncic: "Border Games"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] The upcoming census can also be interpreted as a rerun of the elections, and in this way a statistical project would be transformed into a political battle.

There are high expectations surrounding this year's census, but the most interesting thing will be those figures that will in fact serve as the basis for determining the national "relations of forces" in Yugoslavia. It is precisely on these results that future ethnic-political arguments depend, as do plans for drawing new inter-republic borders on the problematic ethnic principle. For example, will Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina surpass 50 percent of the total population and thus become the standard-bearers of sovereignty in that republic? Or, will Montenegrins, by declaring themselves to be Serbs, as greater Serbian circles are demanding and expecting, become a minority in their own state, thus opening the door to the express unification of the "two Serbian states"?

There are fears everywhere of rigged results and mobilization by individual parties and national groupings in parallel control over the entire process. But this fear is most palpable in Serbia, or rather in the practically invalidated province of Kosovo and in the area where there are demands for provincial status—the Sanjak.

#### Booby-Trapped Census

In the letter sent last month by the leaders of several Albanian parties—Ibrahim Rugova, Hivzi Islami, Shkëlzen Maliqi, Veton Suroi, and Neshat Nurboja—to the Presidency of the SFRY and the FEC [Federal Executive Council], 13 arguments for postponing the census were emphasized. The Albanian alternative movement took advantage of the census as a new opportunity to voice its old demands in connection with the freedoms of the Albanian nation in Kosovo.

The most current of these demands are the calls for the return to work of all Albanians who were thrown out of the Provincial Statistical Office and for the exercise of control over census-takers and the census itself.

However, the highest organs of Serbia and Yugoslavia did not concede to any of these demands. The result of this is known. The Serbian authorities regret that the necessary number of Albanian census-takers cannot be found in many opstinas, while many of them, such as Malisevo, Glogovac, and Suva Reka, still lack census commissions.

It is obvious that the Albanians have booby-trapped this year's census. Because of their large numbers, many statistical patterns, on the Yugoslav level, are becoming

contestable. One of the most important reasons for this boycott of the census is the fear of a desire on the part of the Serbian authorities to statistically reduce and minimize their numbers. In any case, the Albanians left the republican authorities and Yugoslav statisticians with only scant opportunity to manipulate the irrelevant data from 1981. According to those data, there were 1,584,440 people living in Kosovo at the time, of which 1,226,736 were Albanians, 209,497 were Serbs, 34,126 were Gypsies, 27,028 were Montenegrins.... The Kosovo census will be especially interesting in terms of the Serbs and Montenegrins living there. Their numbers will reflect the results of emigration "under pressure," but also the relative success of Milosevic's erroneous policy of halting that process.

Besides Kosovo, the Sanjak is an area experiencing great tension with regard to the census. The SDA [Party of Democratic Action] for Serbia, which is urging the return of Sanjak autonomy, wants to use the results of the census for major political decisions. Proving the ethnic dominance of Muslims in the Sanjak is one step closer to a more decisive separation from Serbia. Recently, Dr. Rasim Ljajic, the secretary of the SDA in Novi Pazar, told a DANAS reporter that a wedge of Serbian population has been driven into the rectangular national area of the Sanjak, as evidenced by the completely changed ethnic structure of Priboj, Pljevalje, Nova Varos.... The SDA has already established a control team intended to—as they say—prevent possible manipulations of the exact number of Muslims in Serbia. According to data from the census 10 years ago, there were 215,166 Muslims living then in Serbia, including the provinces. Of the 9,313,676 total inhabitants, 6,182,155 were Serbs, 1,303,034 were Albanians, 390,468 were Hungarians, 149,368 were Croats, 73,024 were Slovaks, 33,455 were Bulgarians, 25,535 were Vlachs...

Naturally, the census in Serbia will be most interesting in the areas of its practically invalidated provinces and in the Sanjak. Data from 1981 for Vojvodina show the following: of the 2,034,772 total inhabitants, Serbs accounted for 1,107,375, while the number two position was held by Hungarians, with 385,356, followed by Croats with 109,203, Slovaks with 69,549, Romanians with 47,289, and Montenegrins with 43,304.

It is also certain that a rather politicized atmosphere will surround the census in the part of Vojvodina where Bunjevaks [Backa Croats] and Shokaks [Syrmanian and Slavonian Croats] live. Some time ago, at the recommendation of Grga Vojnic, the retired assistant to the director of the provincial statistical office and of the Subotica Executive Committee of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], the so-called "number 28" was included in the census form, where those who consider themselves Bunjevaks can register this identity.

Around 10 days ago, the Bunjevak-Shokak Party was founded in Subotica, its task being, in its own words, to preserve the language, culture, and identity of Bunjevaks

and Shokaks and to resist assimilation, whatever the source. Speaking at the founding meeting, Nikola Cakic, one of the initiators of the founding of the party, emphasized that those who moved to these regions as Bunjevaks and Shokaks want to remain that way. Because Bunjevaks and Shokaks "do not consider themselves Serbs, nor Croats either, because they have never been that, and we say to those who are disturbed by such a orientation that they should leave us in peace and be whatever they want to be." At the founding meeting, Bunjevaks were urged to register "under number 28."

Everyone has the right to speak out as he sees fit and to belong to the party of his choice, but in this case there are a great many clear indications of a desire to use a fabricated scenario to exert influence on free decision-making. The Democratic Alliance of Croats is clearly pointing its finger at the SPS, considering them in particular to be part of the scenario intended to divide Vojvodinan Croats and their influence on the political scene, or even to assimilate them. Even the Croatian clergy of the Subotica Diocese have been raising their voices lately in opposition to the divisions in this ethnic group. In an announcement through the public media, they warn that after half a century, it is now possible to indicate religious affiliation in the census as well, and they refer to the moral obligation of Catholics to indicate their affiliation with that faith. The announcement also says that "members of the Croatian nation must have the consciousness and self-esteem that are inherent to that nation and are obliged to affirm this in the census. We clearly let it be known," the announcement continues, "that the division into Croats, Bunjevaks, and Shokaks is not well-intentioned, because we are all members of the Bunjevak and Shokak ethnic group, but we are also members of a nation—the Croatian one—which has its own history, culture, language, and literature of many centuries' standing."

A citizens group has also issued its appeal in opposition to the divisions. On the other hand, however, the Belgrade press, writing about all these events, has not infrequently ascribed efforts against divisions to an organized campaign by the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], by way of the DSHV [Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina], this in order that as many Croats as possible go on record in Vojvodina, so that—allegedly—the Croatian leadership can claim a right to that part of Vojvodina.

History, too, shows that the Bunjevak-Shokak ethnic group has always been subject to manipulation. Magyarization, greater Serbian pretensions, sometimes wrongful and disappointing connections, before the war, to certain popular parties in Croatia: All of these things are the fate of this population group. The saddest consequence of all of this is that the Bunjevaks, Shokaks, and Vojvodinan Croats have been left without their own institutions, without representatives in the organs of power, and without the opportunity to express their worldly interests.

Right now, it is hard to say how many Croats there will be in Vojvodina after this year's census. Statistics indicate that the number of them in these areas is declining. Thus, in 1918 in Subotica, the heart of the area in which the largest number of Bunjevaks, Shokaks, and Croats live, Croats comprised 72,000 out of the some 100,000 residents; the rest were Serbs, Jews, Germans, Hungarians and part of the Magyarized Germans, Slovaks, and Bunjevaks. According to statistics from 1927, the number of Croats was approximately the same as in 1918, but in 1934 that number had already fallen below 46,000 Croatian souls. The 1948 census said that there were a little more than 48,000 Croatians in Subotica, but the city was also larger, while there were 132,893 Croats in Vojvodina, according to statistics from that year. By 1953, the number of Croats in Subotica had fallen below 46,000. The last census, in 1981, said that there are 32,589 Croats and 8,895 Bunjevaks living in Subotica, who were lumped together with "others" in Serbia's statistics. This is 21 percent of the total population, while in previous years that figure was around 50 and even nearly 70 percent. Furthermore, according to the last census there were around 100,000 Croats in Serbia, which is less than 2 percent of the population. In only 10 years, around 40,000 Croats in Serbia "disappeared," while in Subotica that figure is 13,000. Thus, at least among that population, the new census is being anticipated with particular interest.

#### Montenegrin Pendulum

As far as Montenegrins living in Serbia are concerned, it will be very interesting to see how many of the 147,466 of them who were in Serbia a decade ago will have withstood assimilation and pressure to declare themselves Serbs. As things stand at the moment, the Montenegrins will not have things any easier in their own homeland republic. Specifically, several days ago the People's Party called on Montenegrins to declare themselves as Serbs in the census—and Chetnik leader Vojislav Seselj is insisting that they do the same thing. The implication here is that Montenegrins in the Republic should renounce their own statehood status. Right now, greater Serbian sympathizers have nothing to fear. The Republic is being led by a team that is clearly more loyal to Serbian headquarters than to the Montenegrin option. Still, it is difficult to anticipate the spectacular turnaround that it would signify if less than 50 percent of the total population of Montenegro were Montenegrin, since 400,488 of the approximately 580,000 inhabitants of that republic 10 years ago were of Montenegrin nationality.

In contrast to the Montenegrins, who are gambling with their national state, the dream of a Muslim simple majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina could soon become a reality, or still remain an empty dream. Specifically, the 1981 figures are hardly encouraging to strategists pursuing the rapid achievement of a Muslim nation-building percentage, unless the Sanjak is not also added

in forcibly. Despite the waves of migration from Serbia and Montenegro over the past 10 years, the figures are inexorable.

Bosnia-Herzegovina had a total of 4,124,256 inhabitants 10 years ago. Of that, 1,630,033 were Muslims, 1,320,738 were Serbs, and 758,140 were Croats. Everything points to the conclusion that Bosnia-Herzegovina, which in happier times would not have to be anything worse, has long remained a heterogeneous national triangle. The remainder of "Yugoslavs," on whom the leaders of the national parties are counting, is too modest a reserve to permit a simple majority by any nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Muslim one.

#### Slovenes Calmest

The problem of Istria has stirred up fear, and Serbian secessionism is impatiently anticipating results in the so-called SAO [Socialist Autonomous District of] Krajina and its "border" regions with a mixed Serbian-Croatian population. This seemingly local situation is extremely important in the big game of intrarepublican borders in and around Croatia. According to data from the last census, that republic had 4,601,469 inhabitants. Of that figure, 3,454,661 called themselves Croats, 531,502 Serbs, 25,439 Hungarians, 25,136 Slovenes, and 23,740 Muslims.

All things considered, all of this talk about the census will affect the Slovenes least of all. It is the republic with the most compact national configuration, and Slovenes are an absolute majority. Ten years ago, there were 1,891,864 citizens recorded there. Of that number, as many as 1,712,445 were Slovenes, 55,625 were Croats, and 42,182 were Serbs. Through their plebiscite, moreover, the Slovenes have for all practical purposes already found out the results of the census, and it is certain that there will be no big surprises here.

Macedonia, unlike Slovenia, is noticeably nervous, especially with regard to Macedonian-Albanian relations. This is despite the fact that because of their common feeling of being threatened by Serbian hegemony they have been able to make these relations look more harmonious than they really are. The latest provocation lies in the interpretations and analyses of the 1981 census. At that time, Macedonia had close to two million inhabitants. Macedonians were around 15 percent more numerous than what was necessary to have a simple majority of the total population. There were 1,279,323 of them, 377,208 Albanians, 86,591 Turks, 43,125 Gypsies, and a little less than 40,000 Muslims.

Finally, a little bit about macro-Yugoslav recomputations. After the undisputed dominance of Serbs (according to the last census, they comprise 39.7 percent of the total Yugoslav population), with Croats in second place (22.1 percent), there is a great deal of curiosity about the "vacant" third position. Specifically, it is possible of late to hear quite frequently assessments to the effect that the Albanians are the number three nation in Yugoslavia.

According to the 1981 census, they were way down at number five, with a 6.4 percent share of the country's total population. Ahead of them were Muslims with 8.4 and Slovenes with 8.2 percent. But the Albanian trump card is their famous birth rate, so that it is even more of a loss that we will not know their exact numbers because of the boycott. Furthermore, within the context of the Muslim-Albanian numerical race, the idea that can be heard coming from individual members of the SDA and from Muslim religious circles is very interesting. According to their expectations, the census could show that around 6 million Muslims are currently living in Yugoslavia?! This is the figure obtained by adding together Albanians and Muslims.

But that is like adding apples and oranges.

Whether the Yugoslav Gypsies will also demonstrate this type of collective discipline remains to be seen. A month

and a half from now, when the first results of the census are expected, we will have a total for Yugoslav "Egyptians," as some of them have decided to declare their nationality. The specific customs and the culture of the members of that nation, the presence of greater or lesser racism towards them, and various political manipulations (like the Kosovo slogan, "Serbs, the Gypsies are with you") have dictated the attempt to find a remedy for the aforementioned complex in the name "Egyptians."

The statistical sketching of the new ethnic map of Yugoslavia—even though the tasks of the census are much more ambitious and comprehensive—is being anticipated with a great deal of impatience and tension. The preliminary politicization of the census, which culminated in the Albanian boycott in Kosovo, will certainly continue with the announcement of this year's results.

## POLAND

### Commentary on Air Force Technical, Cadre Status

91EP0397C Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
4 Mar 91 p 4

[Interview with Colonel Antoni Grzedzinski, deputy commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Troops for Engineering and Supplies, by Stanislaw Lukaszewski; place and date not given: "Engineers Are Not Afraid To Speak the Truth"]

[Text] [Lukaszewski] Until recently, we could only refer to restructuring; now we admit that this was, after all, a reduction, the process of which has not been completed. What is the status of these changes in the Flight Engineering Service of the Air Force in our Armed Forces?

[Grzedzinski] As of 1 January 1990, the service was at 78.4 percent of full strength. In the middle of the year, the ZLT (Flight Technical Supply) personnel and personnel servicing aviation materiel on the ground were once again included in the flight engineering personnel. This caused an increase in our authorized strength. As of the end of the year, we were at 78.9 percent of full strength, including the newly gained personnel, out of which it was 84.4 percent for officers, 98.8 percent for warrant officers, and 56.6 percent for professional non-commissioned officers. A decline in the strength, primarily of officers, was due to the well-known retirement projection which by the end of the year prompted not only officers to resign from professional military service.

[Lukaszewski] May we predict a return to some kind of normalcy following a wave of retiring to reserves in 1989 and especially in 1990?

[Grzedzinski] I interpret a return to normalcy as a condition before 1989 when transfers to beyond the SIL, or the Flight Engineering Service (reserves, other services, retirement, and so on) did not exceed five percent of the actual strength in the case of officers and three percent in the case of warrant officers. The fact that 45.1 percent of the ensigns and 30.8 percent of the officers are under 30 is an additional argument. Our prediction is that this year 48 WAT [Military Technical Academy] graduates will offset 80 percent of the officer transfers, and 170 graduates will fill staff vacancies in the case of warrant officers. The units have reported requirements for these numbers. I will stress that these are calculations for the tables of organization currently in effect. However, taking into account the planned restructuring undertakings in the entire Army, we are planning to fill even as much as 90 percent of the officer positions in the SIL [Flight Engineering Service], and up to 97 percent of the warrant officer positions.

I would like to caution at this point that the coming years will see a considerably smaller influx of flight engineers and technicians to the units. On this occasion, I would like to stress that professional noncommissioned officers

are the weakest link in the SIL in view of vacancies in positions which are primarily involved in directly servicing the materiel.

[Lukaszewski] What main tasks does the Flight Engineering Service accomplish?

[Grzedzinski] It ensures complete flight engineer support for flight training by improving planning, organization, and management of the service; maintains a high level of technical discipline; improves the quality of training of the flight personnel and that of the SIL building on issues resulting from the breakdowns of the aircraft; conducts precise analyses and research into the reasons for the breakdowns which occur and undertakes appropriate prevention measures; ensures proper conditions for the work of the SIL personnel promoting the atmosphere of quietly servicing aircraft without excessive haste and unjustified nervousness, while enhancing at the same time the discipline of execution; secures improvements in the technical condition and reliability of the aircraft by means of timely performed services, immediate elimination of breakdowns, and the timely performance of test flights.

[Lukaszewski] What changes have occurred after the restructuring of the Air Force and the Air Defense Troops of the country?

[Grzedzinski] The flight and technical supply service was subordinated to the chief WLiOP [Air Force and Air Defense Troops] engineer. This should bring tangible results in the field of technical supply, the circulation of information, and the maintenance of the combat readiness of the aircraft. This service provides materiel and combat means to the units. It also oversees the operation and supply of ground service and high altitude rescue equipment. This year, the service will introduce a new system of supply and record keeping, make quantitative and qualitative changes in the storage of aviation combat materiel and means, and new equipment for feeding and charging batteries, withdraw from use and repair ground service equipment, and introduce a data processing system. We will repattern the system of supply management.

[Lukaszewski] How did inspections evaluate the Flight Engineering Service of the Air Force of our Armed Forces?

[Grzedzinski] As usual, we got top grades for the condition and maintenance of the basic aircraft. Divisions were also distinguished by the high quality and good standard of performance in tactical and special exercises. Unfortunately, this was not the case in all regiments. Our guidelines were not duly followed in practice in all subunits. We still lack sufficient imagination for adapting the role of technician to actions on a possible future battlefield.

[Lukaszewski] What was the reliability of aircraft materiel in the Air Force in 1990?



[Grzedzinski] It amounted to 85 percent, staying at the level of previous years.

[Lukaszewski] I have heard that the limit of service life has been exceeded for some types of planes.

[Grzedzinski] Indeed, 549 hours were flown on the MiG-23U planes instead of the planned 360. Such practices are fraught with considerable danger. Exceeding this limit this year will be considered a lack of discipline and will entail consequences in the line of duty. However, I would like to add that such practices are the result of training needs and at the same time the result of a lack of the appropriate number of training combat aircraft which we cannot buy anyway due to the lack of deliveries.

[Lukaszewski] What is the status of repairs domestically and abroad?

[Grzedzinski] In 1990, the repair of 130 planes and 341 engines domestically was planned. In conjunction with the restructuring of the Air Force and the impossibility of meeting the quantitative needs with the allocated quotas of funds, the repair plan was revised, and the number of plane repairs was reduced to 103, and that of engine repairs to 286. At present, we are having difficulties repairing the SU-22 planes.

In an effort to further improve service facilities for the SU-22's, we decided to repair its equipment domestically. These facilities have not yet been fully established, despite the fact that repairs have already begun. However, time is still needed to ensure services in full, including for the receipt of the deliveries of technology, equipment, and spare parts from the Soviet Union.

We planned to repair 28 planes and 126 engines at foreign enterprises. By now, 14 planes and 83 engines have been repaired.

[Lukaszewski] I have also heard that we do not have spare engines.

[Grzedzinski] The problem for us is that to this day we do not have signed repair contracts with either the USSR or Germany. All designated engines should have already been shipped for repairs. Indeed, until they return there will be no spare engines of some types.

[Lukaszewski] How would you explain the relatively high rate of breakdowns on the SU-22 and MiG-29 aircraft?

[Grzedzinski] Compared to other types of aircraft, there are more breakdowns because this is new, sophisticated air force materiel rather than because the equipment is defective. This is the rule. This is the case throughout the world.

Weapons control equipment on modern planes requires service in as little as three to nine hours. For example, the control system and the radar on the F-4 planes are inspected after each flight. On the F-15, the radar is

inspected after each six hours of flight, and this requires 20 man-hours. Mathematics confirms these facts. We may calculate, based on the theory of probability, that, if a radar consists of 20,000 parts, each of which has a breakdown-free life of 120,000 hours, the entire device will have a life of six hours.

Any sophisticated system which has tens of thousands of elements is necessarily less reliable than a simple system. On many occasions, economic considerations call for a particular standard of service entailed by its breakdowns.

A lack of certain ordered spare parts is yet another issue. In the West, commercial contracts include a provision by virtue of which the supplier must deliver a spare part necessary to eliminate a breakdown within a very short period of time. Unfortunately, the issue of the lack of spare parts is generally known in our country. On occasion, we wait for a very long time.

[Lukaszewski] Why?

[Grzedzinski] This is a quite complex problem. This is the result of a different system of financing, as well as the capacity of our country's economy.

This is the whole truth.

[Lukaszewski] Do changes in the Armed Forces influence the system of training the technical personnel of the Air Force?

[Grzedzinski] Basic military service was reduced from 24 to 18 months. In conjunction with this, the training of future aviation mechanics was reduced from five to three months (four shifts a year) without a one-month course of on-the-job training in military units. We accept these changes with some apprehension concerning the quality of specialized training.

The latest decision of the minister of national defense on one-year basic service greatly complicates the training process for us. However, we count on the subsequent decision on contract service to be introduced simultaneously with this decision.

[Lukaszewski] Colonel, what is the outlook for the Flight Engineering Service this year?

[Grzedzinski] Regardless of the tasks and avenues of operation of the service set forth in the planning documents of the Air Force and Air Defense Troops, I see a need to concentrate the entire effort of the SIL personnel on increasing the use of plane resources by organizing the system of using plane resources more effectively.

We should also take into account the rigors of economic accountability....

However, the safety of flights and the technical reliability of the aircraft are the most important. The introduction of organizational changes in the system of

aircraft servicing should bring about securing an opportunity to fly 150 to 200 hours per plane a year.

Specialists who do not guarantee meeting the requirements set forth for them will be released from work with the aircraft. However, I would like to stress here that they are few.

Exceptionally dedicated personnel work in technical services. I believe that this provides a guarantee for the flight personnel that our tasks will be accomplished in a competent and safe manner.

[Lukaszewski] Thank you for the interview.

### **More Civilian Administrative Posts Proposed**

91EP0397B Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish  
12 Mar 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Andrzej Medykowski: "Only Civilians Are Behind the Desks of Officials"]

[Text] On Monday, 11 March, the Interdepartmental Commission for Reforms in the Organization of National Defense met for the second time. Deputy Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz outlined at this meeting a concept of the ministry according to which it would be a civilian organ of state administration in charge of the issues of national defense. Civilian structures would be separated from military structures, and both would have strictly defined jurisdictions. As a result, two segments would be separated: a civilian-military segment (with three deputy ministers) and subordinated organizational units, and a military segment in which the Armed Forces would be placed in its entirety. Organizational units reporting directly to the minister would be outside these two segments.

In keeping with this concept, such a structure of the ministry would make it possible to link the defense sphere more effectively with the state administration and the national economy. The command of the Armed Forces would be expressly separate from the issues of supplying the Armed Forces and leading them politically. This would also make it possible to fully carry out the postulate of depoliticizing the Armed Forces. Cooperation with parliament and the future National Security Council would also be closer. As a result, the number of professional servicemen holding positions which do not require a military education would decrease. Therefore, it would be possible to further reduce the strength of the Armed Forces, and servicemen would no longer perform the functions of officials. It may be assumed that the prestige of the profession and respect for the uniform would increase considerably.

What would civilian deputy ministers do? The deputy minister for education would be responsible for setting forth the planks of cultural and social policy. He would be in charge of issues associated with ministry to the Armed Forces and cooperation with paramilitary and veterans' organizations. The issues of education, the

development of patriotic attitudes, and training (for example, secondary—military secondary schools) would be yet another group of problems. The study of sentiments and opinion and the condition of interpersonal relations in the Army would fall within the scope of his responsibilities. He would be in charge of the issues associated with the military press, publishing houses, and culture.

The deputy minister for the issues of defense policy and planning would engage in developing a defense concept, establishing its main premises, studying and assessing the condition of the country's security (from the point of view of military threat), and analyzing political and economic issues and their influence on the sphere of defense, issues associated with the broadly defined relations between the ministry and foreign countries, the financial policy of the department, and cooperation with parliament. A data processing center would also report to this deputy minister. Handling the issues of materiel and license procurement and scientific-technical cooperation, studies concerning, for example, weaponry, political doctrines of the world, etc. would be a significant issue.

The deputy minister for the issues of weapons and infrastructure would be involved in the issues of logistics, interpreted as broadly as possible, infrastructure, planning the development and adoption of materiel, import, export, and cooperation in the production of military equipment, supply of the Armed Forces (centralized), enterprises of the defense industry, and, more broadly, the potential of the national defense industry. Of course, this would require close cooperation with the military segment.

In the course of the discussion, suggestions were made concerning the refinement of jurisdiction in the segments. Responding to questions and reservations made, Deputy Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz dwelled in more detail on the points outlined in the submitted documents which were by necessity succinct. After precise proposals are set forth in cooperation with other teams, they will be presented at the very next meeting. As indicated by a lively discussion upon the completion of the official proceedings, it may be necessary to meet in small working groups and work on certain issues.

So far, the concept of the format of the civilian-military segment presented at the meeting of the commission and the scope of issues of which the deputy ministers would be in charge is merely a proposal. Other solutions which make it possible to accomplish the defined goals are certainly possible as well. Commission Chairman Krzysztof Zabinski noted the need to precisely outline the tasks and functions of the deputy ministers, and to transfer some responsibilities to other ministries, if possible, as well as to refine the relationship between the Committee for the Defense of the Country, the future National Security Council, and the Ministry of National Defense.

Among others, the issue of control functions and corresponding organs (or organ) caused reservations. However, it appears that these were, somehow, just-in-case reservations which were a result of past experiences rather than the future duplication of responsibilities. Besides, nobody likes being controlled....

The outlined concept of the format of the Ministry of National Defense, and especially of the civilian-military

segment, appears not to cause controversy among the members of the commission. The issue of responsibilities and the discussion associated with them appear to involve mainly refining them in such a way as to separate them distinctly. We may venture the assertion that the need to reform the Ministry of Defense, which has been perceived and expressed for some time, is now at the stage of mature discussion. Perhaps, the time to decide and undertake specific, practical activities is not too far away.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### Kucerak, Ondrus on Slovak Economic Reform

AU2404162391 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES  
in Czech 18 Apr pp 1-2

[Interview with Slovak Deputy Prime Ministers Jozef Kucerak and Vladimir Ondrus by Ivo Slavik; place and date not given: "A Political Trick"—first paragraph is MLADA FRONTA DNES introduction]

[Text] On 16 April the Slovak government rejected a report drafted by Jozef Kucerak on the coordination of economic reform in Slovakia. Prior to that, under unclear circumstances, Minister Filkus withdrew his report from the agenda. Suspicion was aroused that it was not an economic dispute within the Slovak government, but rather a political one. In this connection, Prime Minister Meciar presented a proposal to reshuffle the government and accused his deputy prime ministers of unethical behavior. We asked Jozef Kucerak and Vladimir Ondrus about their opinions.

[Slavik] Do you not believe that it was a trick when Minister Filkus withdrew his report from the government's agenda?

[Kucerak] I hate suspicion, yet it is true that a few days ago both reports, mine and that of Filkus, were jointly discussed in the Economic Council. Some 40 experts expressed their opinions that the reports complemented each other. It is also possible that he withdrew his because its internal contradictions would have to be discussed.

[Slavik] Can you be more precise?

[Kucerak] Above all, there are contradictions in the linkage: revaluating [the koruna]—abolishing the import surcharge—minimizing unemployment. The proposal lacks basic macroeconomic views. If we revalue the koruna and abolish the import surcharge at the same time, this would also imply, apart from lowering the price of competitors' imports, a lack of equilibrium in the balance of payments and higher unemployment.

[Slavik] You are being reproached for sticking to the scenario of economic reform too tightly, with not accepting any suggestions, and with not giving a specific shape to economic reform.

[Kucerak] The scenario is not only a piece of paper, although I do not affirm, of course, that the scenario is a dogma. In any case, it contains basic philosophy. Many ministers want to give a specific shape to economic reform. However, how are we supposed to do that when, a year after the approval of its scenario, we must—being forced to defend basic steps—lose time and energy among the ministers who had adopted the government program. Such a specific shape—pushed for by some ministers, including the prime minister—would be a grave, and not the implementation of reform.

[Ondrus] Of course, the withdrawal of Filkus' material was politically motivated. The prime minister said as recently as one week ago that there were two versions of the report on the coordination of the steps of economic reform in Slovakia: "One that was prepared by Minister Filkus (this one respects the specifics of economic reform in Slovakia) and the second, prepared by Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Kucerak, which is more theoretical. Our opinions in the government diverge significantly. Ministers from individual sectors are on one side and both deputy prime ministers are on the other." However, at the session of the Economic Council on 12 April 1991, no controversies appeared during the discussion about both reports and members of the council considered them to be two mutually complementary reports and recommended their discussion in the Slovak government. At a government session, the prime minister had to confirm his previously expressed opinion and this is why he proposed that Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kucerak's report be rejected. A vote—in recent weeks motivated more by political views than by expert views—followed.

### Unemployment Rises in Both Republics

AU2304122191 Prague CTK in English 1425 GMT  
19 Apr 91

[Text] Prague April 19 (CTK)—There were 184,600 unemployed in Czechoslovakia on March 31, 1991; nearly 90,000 or 1.9 percent in the Czech Republic; and nearly 95,000 or 3.8 percent in Slovakia, according to a survey of the Federal Statistical Office.

At the end of March there were 44,600 vacancies in the whole of Czechoslovakia, only 7,300 of which in Slovakia. A total of 118,000 persons received unemployment benefits.

Prices in the first three months of 1991 were by 54 percent higher than in the same period of last year, and grew by 33.8 percent from December 1990 to March 1991.

Industrial output in the first three months of the year was 11.9 percent lower than in the same period of last year, and more than 25 percent lower in March 1991 than in March 1990.

### 'Alarming' March Economic Figures Published

AU2404095191 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY  
in Czech 19 Apr 91 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Serious Signals in March"]

[Text] According to a Federal Statistical Office report, industrial goods production in March 1991 was 25.3 percent lower than in the same month last year. [The volume of] construction work carried out by contractors was lower by as much as 47.8 percent.

In the first three months of this year, industrial goods production remained at 11.9 percent below the level of

last year's first quarter, and civil engineering was 35.8 percent below last year's level (after the elimination of price effects). Despite the fact that the March results are alarming, even prior to that, signals were registered in the form of a declining transportation volume and in accumulated marketing problems on both domestic and foreign markets. Organizations' significant inability to pay—if their financial means are literally drowned in inventories—stems from this.

The growth of consumer prices has eased a little during recent weeks and, in some cases, even a moderate drop has taken place. The most important thing is, however, that supply is beginning to face lower buyer demand. Retail sales of selected enterprises reached 22.9 billion korunas in March and, compared to March last year—in current prices—this sales figure was smaller by 4.9 percent and expressed in the physical volume (after elimination of price effects) it was 43.9 percent lower than last year. Expressed in figures for the entire first quarter, the physical volume of retail sales was 37.1 percent lower than in the first quarter of 1990. The decreasing trend in the procurement of basic animal products continued. Compared to the first quarter of 1990, in the first quarter of 1991 the procurement of slaughter animals was lower by 27.3 percent, and this also applies to the procurement of milk (- 7.7 percent) and eggs (- 32.8 percent) and, partially, also to poultry (- 4 percent).

Cargo transportation mirrors current developments. In January, February, and March, railways transported 52.1 million tonnes of goods, that is, 18 percent less than in the first quarter of last year. Because of the lower volume of industrial and civil engineering production, the transporters' demands also dropped. With the exception of ores (+ 1.4 percent), the loading of all main bulk commodities on railways has dropped.

### **Rights, Responsibilities of Unemployed Published**

91CH0446A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY  
in Czech 28 Feb 91 p 5

[Article by Pavla Cisarova and Zuzana Knezu: "What Rights and Obligations Does an Unemployed Individual Have? What To Do"]

[Text] Labor offices have already been set up in all our okreses to help deal with a situation for which we are still not fully prepared. In order to make cooperation easier for the participants, we are presenting the basic situations and their resolutions according to the new legal regulation.

An employed citizen who is considering changing his job and requests information from a labor office in the CSFR is a prospective job applicant. If the employment relationship is terminated you must visit the labor office in your place of residence without delay. In order to be entered in the files of job applicants you must have a letter of discharge from your last employer, confirmation of the amount of your average net monthly income, a

citizen's ID, and you must fill out an application form requesting mediation of suitable employment. Together with a labor office employee you will evaluate the kind of job you would like and your options; if the jobs listed include suitable employment, you will deal with the organizations on the basis of a recommendation on the agreed date, and you will notify the labor office. Keeping the appointment is, among other things, proof that the applicant is seriously interested in finding work, and this is one of the conditions for granting unemployment benefits.

If the applicant does not find a job within seven calendar days from submission of the application for mediation of suitable employment, he has the right to receive unemployment benefits for the time he is unemployed and is seriously looking for work, but for no more than one year.

For the first six months, the amount of the unemployment benefits depends on the reason for the loss of employment (organizational—65 percent of the average net monthly income, other—60 percent, the same as the second half of the year). If the calculated amount of the unemployment benefits would be less than 1,200.00 korunas [Kcs] (as of 1 March 1991 Kcs1,400.00), the unemployment benefits will be set at that amount as long as the calculation base is higher. Another condition for providing unemployment benefits is that the applicant was employed for at least twelve months during the three years preceding submission of the application. If compensation is paid, the right to receive unemployment benefits commences only after the time covered by the compensation has elapsed—but essentially it is expected to start from the date of termination of employment.

A job applicant asserts his entitlement to a child allowance at the okres, obvod, or Prague Social Security Administration. Applicants must submit proof from the Labor Office that they have been entered in the files of job applicants.

The allocated unemployment benefits are always paid at the end of each month, i.e., around the 20th of the month for the preceding month.

If the applicant does not meet the conditions—he does not follow up on the job recommended in the organization, does not visit the labor office within the set time or when requested to do so, does not notify it of a change of address, refuses suitable employment, refuses retraining offered to him, etc., the payment will be stopped.

If the job applicant decides to start an enterprise, he is obligated to notify the labor office as soon as he applies for registration for an independent earning activity. Before he starts his entrepreneurial activity (his income is under Kcs400.00 per month) and if he is seriously looking for suitable employment in addition to this activity, he is an applicant with a right to unemployment benefits. If expert opinion confirms the efficiency of the chosen enterprise, he can agree on a contribution with the labor office on condition that he will continue the

entrepreneurial activity in that field for at least two years. The amount of reimbursement of expenses for one new job may not exceed twenty times the average monthly unemployment benefits paid by the labor office during the preceding quarter to job applicants. Reimbursement of the allowance is only charged if the contractual agreements are not observed.

If there is no demand for the applicant's profession on the labor market, the labor office will offer him the option to retrain. The choice should be made carefully so that the applicant will be able to find employment after he has completed the retraining. Retraining should not be repeated. During the entire training period (even if it takes longer than the one-year entitlement to unemployment benefits), the applicant will be paid 70 percent of the average net monthly income from his last employment. The agreement on retraining is concluded between the job applicant and the labor office. If the contract is not fulfilled, the expenses incurred for retraining may be charged to the job applicant for reimbursement.

The applicant remains on the labor office's files for the entire period that he is seriously looking for employment. He is removed from the files if he does not fulfill a job applicant's obligations, if he enters employment, or if he starts to receive an old-age or disability pension (with the exception of individuals whose health has been especially seriously affected, and whose employment requires the creation of special working conditions).

If there is repeated lack of success in finding a job and the applicant has received unemployment benefits for one year, his needs can be covered through benefits from social security resources. In this case, he submits his application to the obvod or okres Social Affairs and Health Office.

At this time the labor offices have a monopoly as employment mediators, and this mediation is free. Employment Mediation for profit is prohibited.

The establishment and activities of the labor office are regulated by Law No. 1/1991 on Employment, Czech National Council Law No. 9/1991 on Employment and the Activity of the Agencies of the Czech Republic in the Employment Sector, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Czech Republic Ruling No. 20/1991 that establishes more detailed conditions for the provision of unemployment benefits to job applicants, Ministry Ruling No. 21/1991 on more detailed conditions of ensuring the retraining of job applicants and employees, and Ministry Ruling No. 22/1991 that establishes the details of creating socially purposeful jobs and the creation of publicly beneficial work. The new legal provisions came into force on 1 February 1991.

## **Social Security, Health Insurance System Outlined**

*91CH0446B Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY  
in Czech 28 Feb 91 p 5*

[Article by CK: "Will We Return to the Custom of Social Security? Guarantee of Securities"]

[Text] The draft of the new form of social security, which Minister P. Miller will submit to the government by the end of the second quarter, is based on a public law insurance system that is obligatory and uniform for all citizens and is guaranteed by the state. We are presenting to you the Ministry's basic concept on the method of providing social guarantees to all citizens, which should be clear and would enforce ideas of social solidarity and participation in resolving social incidents.

The insurance, to which all citizens living permanently on the territory of our Republic will be subject, will provide the legal, economic, and social guarantees of acquired rights, adapted to the needs and personal endeavors of each individual. The FMPSV [Federal Ministry of Labor and Social Security] is working with experts from the International Labor Organization to establish the amount of the payment. Preliminary calculations show that the total amount of the payment will be around 28 percent of the income (5 percent for health and 23 percent for pension benefits). It is assumed that employees will pay about one-third and organizations two-thirds.

The security will be independent of the state and will be administered in a democratic manner. This requires the foundation of an autonomous social security fund that is not dependent on the state budget, and the creation of administrative councils, which will make the decisions on the management of the fund. Child allowances, family allowances, allowances for parents, support for the birth of a child, funeral contributions, social welfare benefits, health services and spa treatment, and accident and occupational disease benefits will not be paid from it.

Health and pension insurance will be provided from social security.

### **1. Health Insurance**

Health insurance creates the resources to deal with short-term social incidents caused by such situations as the temporary inability to work, quarantine, care for a sick family member, or care for a healthy child below the age of ten, pregnancy, and maternity. The FMPSV has suggested that the amount of the health insurance should be set as a percentage based on the daily average of the allocation base in such a way that the former relation between the benefit and the income is essentially retained, i.e., that it is 70 percent of the income on average.

## 2. Pension Insurance

The Pension Insurance Fund is intended for long-term insurance for old-age, disability, loss of the breadwinner, and threat to livelihood. The pension insurance will be made possible through a multicomponent structure of calculating the amount of the pension. The first component will be a uniform basic pension equal to two-thirds of the pension paid as the sole source of income (at the present time this would be equivalent to approximately 800 korunas [Kcs]). Entitlement to this basic component is contingent on paying the insurance for ten years. The second component will be derived from the amount of income and the number of years the insurance was paid, and the third component will be created from various additional payments that may be of a health, economic, or social nature.

The present age limit of 60 will be retained for men, with the proviso that each individual will be allowed to decide when to retire within the age range of 60 to 65, according to his own abilities and circumstances. A uniform age limit will be introduced for women, which will not take into account the number of children raised (it is expected to be 57).

Parallel pension and income will be dealt with on the principle "pension or wages." Compared to the present situation, newly granted old-age pensions will on average not increase in relation to wages; they will be about two-thirds of the net individual wage (assuming an average wage and an average number of years of employment). The pension systems in developed countries during the past few years have considered a pension to income (gross) relation of about 60-70 percent to be appropriate.

Various forms of supplementary systems for additional insurance will enable citizens to meet their needs according to their individual resources, and within the context of professional or entrepreneurial arrangements, they can be a motivating tool to attract workers to less desirable jobs.

The system of obligatory social security will be supplemented by the offer of options for additional insurance. It will be possible to obtain additional insurance either individually or collectively with a contribution from the employer. In large organizations it will be in cooperation with the Trade Unions and through commercial insurance companies.

The new law on social security, including the creation of the legal and organizational prerequisites will be drafted during this year and next year so that the new form of social security will be introduced as of 1993.

## HUNGARY

### Gonczi Receives President Suzuki of Japan

*LD2304202891 Budapest MTI in English 1646 GMT  
23 Apr 91*

[Text] Budapest, 23 April (MTI)—On Tuesday, Arpad Goncz, president of the Republic of Hungary, met Osamu Suzuki, president of the Japanese Suzuki motor corporation, who arrived in Hungary on Monday. The Japanese businessman gave briefs on the expected production programme of Suzuki's assembly plant in Esztergom. He said the 1,100 staff members of the plant would be sent to Japan on a six-month study trip to become familiar with the Japanese methods and attitude to work.

Gonczi stressed that the new joint venture formed part of Hungary's political and economic endeavour to develop and expand its relations with the Pacific region.

### Organizations Support World Expo Plan

*91CH0473A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
8 Mar 91 p 5*

[Article by Zsuzsa Regos: "There Should by All Means Be a World Expo"]

[Text] Professional organizations, associations, chambers, societies, and entrepreneurs, representing almost 70 percent of the economy's players, signed a cooperative agreement yesterday in the headquarters of the National Federation of Trade Associations to set up the World Expo Forum.

The agreement's signatories believe that local Budapest authorities will approve the expo at their general meeting in early May. Their confidence is based not only on the fact that 17 of Budapest's districts have already cast an affirmative vote on the issue, but also on their opinion that the Hungarian public also supports the series of events scheduled for 1995. According to the participants of the new forum, the economy can only move out of its present low ebb if it is given a significant task. According to estimates, the World Expo may provide jobs for at least 200,000 persons. Part of the billions of dollars needed for the investments are expected to come from foreign investors, but Hungarian entrepreneurs also have liquid capital.

Hungarian entrepreneurs consider Pozsony's "entering" the ring as a warning sign. They hope that not only Budapest's authorities, who are delaying the decision, but also the government will have a say in the matter. In case the government's letter of indemnity cannot be deposited in Paris on 17 July, the entrepreneurs will make "their own World Expo": They will build a little settlement in Transdanubia called Pannonian City, which may replace Budapest as the central site of the events.

### Financial Woes Beset Local Governments

91CH0473C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian  
8 Mar 91 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Will There Be No Nurseries After June?"]

[Text] (From our correspondent) On the basis of signed authorizations from 1,030 mayors, Hungary's four independent local government lobby organizations would like to conduct talks and constructively cooperate with the government to have the indispensable laws regarding property, tasks, sphere of authority, and public service drafted and passed as soon as possible in an atmosphere that is friendly to local governments. But since they received no reply as of 7 March to their letter of 7 February 1991, addressed to Prime Minister Jozsef Antall, they made their concerns public at yesterday's press conference held in the Kecskeket City Hall.

Kecskeket Mayor Jozsef Merasz (president of the Association of Cities with County Status) announced that "the local governments' functioning is in jeopardy," adding that they would like to be partners, not opponents, of the government. Levente Levay (mayor of Kispest) added to this that the government is responsible for the appropriate functioning of democracy's institutional system, including local governments. If this will not work and, let us say, the local governments will fall, the government will evidently also fall with them.

The ownership issue is still unclear, and local government authority is still unregulated. The establishment of newer offices under ministerial jurisdiction eliminates local tasks, and authority, and transfers them into central hands. Certain new laws compel settlements to do things for which there is absolutely no provision in their budget.

Levente Levay replied to the inquiry of NEPSZABADSAG's correspondent as to how he would describe the local governments' financial situation by saying:

"We must reckon with the closing of several hundred nurseries by the end of the summer. In Budapest, the cost for each child is in excess of 100,000 forints, with no contribution by the state. The annual cost of each kindergarten space, which is part of the basic compulsory provisions, is 55,000 forints, 15,000 of which is paid by the state from the national budget.

### Postabank President Comments on Stock Market

91CH0457A Budapest REFORM in Hungarian  
22 Feb 91 p 35

[Interview with Postabank President Gabor Prinz by Maria Varga; place and date not given: "Those Who Like Games Are at an Advantage"]

[Text] However small, the Budapest stock market, it seems, is starting to become interesting. Nearly every bank has established a brokerage office, and accepts

commissions to buy and sell stocks. That is what Postabank has done. One of the most successful commercial banks, Postabank's specialty is the local business branch. We asked managing director Gabor Prinz about participating in the stock market.

[Varga] To whom do you recommend the purchase of stocks?

[Prinz] If I were to reply facetiously, I would say: to people who like games, people to whom rummy, gambling, pin-the-tail-on-the-donkey are not foreign. If I were to reply seriously? I would say the same thing. But it must be made clear that stocks are not for everyone. You can lose, as well as win, with them. Someone who wants a sure thing should choose bonds or savings accounts or treasury notes, which yield a guaranteed interest. My other misgiving is that the Hungarian stock market, still in its infancy, is being run from Vienna. If Austrian brokers buy stocks in our country, then the stock market becomes bullish. Right now in the world of finance, our stock market is a small potato. It is the thing of the future, in all likelihood. But presently you just get savings with fixed interest and computable yield.

[Varga] Yet Postabank accepts brokerage commissions.

[Prinz] Of course we do. We took part in the sale of Dunaholding stocks, and we arranged things so that no one had to stand in line here. But it is undeniable that today the same 5 thousand to 10 thousand "gamblers" still buy and sell stocks on the market. You can't get a lot of money to circulate that way. You do it by offering small investors good terms and dependable bank services. Last year we invested several billion forints of 231,000 customers' money.

[Varga] Nowadays, Postabank is often mentioned in the same breath as Japan's Nomura Bank. How are they essentially related?

[Prinz] We founded a joint bank with the Japanese giant and the State Insurance Enterprise. We put in a bid to the State Property Agency and won the right to carry out privatization of the Danubius Hotel.

[Varga] How is the Danubius going to be privatized? Will it end up in the hands of foreigners or native sons?

[Prinz] We're still just in the planning stage. What is certain is that it will remain a hotel establishment and garner capital from several sources.

[Varga] Who can make use of Postabank's newest service, the entrepreneurial credit package?

[Prinz] Starting this year, the Entrepreneurial Credit Club will operate from 15 Szuret Street in Budapest. We will run it together with the National Association of Entrepreneurs (VOSZ). On the basis of our guidelines, the School of Economics agency called Economix will "cast its light" on the entrepreneur who applies for credit. On Economix's recommendation, we provide the



candidate with the credit necessary to operate his business. He receives the credit in as many installments as he wishes. We always "stand by him" and "take his hand." We give him advice about taxes, legal matters, and real estate purchases. The most difficult thing for an enterprise is to obtain the credit necessary for continuous operation. It's not easy getting started, but to maintain continuity and overcome obstacles—that requires help. It is advantageous to VOSZ members to have to take stock of their affairs just once a year, not every time they receive credit. This way they clearly see for themselves their financial situation and obtain an untainted picture of their enterprise.

**[Box, p 35]**

When it comes to taxes, there is a good side and a bad side to buying stocks. Which one should we start with? The advantage is that we can deduct the value of purchased stocks from our personal income tax base, provided that we purchased the stocks during the past year. Because two years ago this was still not "fashionable." If we now combine our taxes, we deduct the price of stocks purchased last year, and that's all there is to it!

The bad side is that we must pay taxes on the yield from our stocks: a 20-percent tax is imposed. If we made a profit by selling stocks during the past year, i.e., if we managed to sell our stocks at a higher price than what we paid for them, then we simply add 20 percent of the difference to the taxes we must pay.

If the company that we own stocks in and that paid us a dividend (in general they really do pay—some 20 percent, some 120 percent) did well this year, then our joy is premature. Twenty percent of this profit from stocks is pocketed by the government. If we grumble and mutter, "confound it, this is double taxation," then we're right. We are free to grumble, but we have to pay taxes.

I can almost hear you ask if there is a loophole. There is a little crevice. There are brokerage firms that carry out stock transactions anonymously. They accept a commission without having to disclose our names or further particulars. Thus, the tax authorities cannot learn from them how much we made on a deal, and the stock owner can joyfully "swallow" his profit for the time being. (Plans are under way to plug up the crevice with a nice little amendment to the law.)

**Small Commercial Bank Manager on Prospects**

*91CH0457B Budapest REFORM in Hungarian  
22 Feb 91 p 34*

[Interview with Gyorgy Kun, director of the enterprise branch of the General Commercial Bank; place and date not given: "There Must Not Be an Unsuccessful Transaction: General Commercial Bank Also Privatized NEP-SZABADSAG"]

[Text] The General Commercial Bank, Inc., is one of the oldest members of our domestic banking system. It was

founded in 1922, prior to creation of the Hungarian National Bank, under the name Hungarian Trade and Commerce Holding Bank. The bank's main function at that time was to manage and monitor the domestic currency, first the korona, then the pengo, as well as foreign outstanding debts. Since then, the bank has operated as a joint-stock company. First, it worked in close cooperation with the Central Corporation of Banking Companies. Then in 1987, after introduction of the two-tier banking system, the licensed and independent commercial bank embarked on its present-day activities. Since 1990, it has been a Hungarian/North American joint-interest bank. Today, as new banks are formed weekly in Hungary, the General Commercial Bank, Inc., not only solidifies its traditional position but also offers new services in new areas.

"We're a small bank with fixed assets of 1 billion forints. So our potential is limited," says Gyorgy Kun, director of the enterprise branch. "We do not aim to become a bank that pulls off colossal deals, but rather a domestic bank of carefully chosen companies. Because we have considerable experience and tradition in managing foreign currency transactions, our essential goal is to serve our customers. We want to be able to analyze and manage the foreign and domestic currency operations of the companies with whom we cooperate on the basis of mutual advantage. We want to be able to satisfy their credit needs, handle their deposits and accounts, their foreign and domestic bills of exchange. We make every effort to interrelate with these companies and to serve our customers. We assume that a bank is good if its customers are strong and solvent."

[REFORM] Most banks compete for the patronage of the citizenry. Offices are being opened one after the other.

[Kun] We cannot set out to compete with the Postabank or the Hungarian Credit Bank, because they have at their disposal huge fixed assets and broad networks of branch offices. They are interlinked with the entire population. With our diversity and special services, we will be competitive with any domestic banking institution.

[REFORM] Are you always so cautious when you enter into a new deal?

[Kun] We carefully think things through, because we have to invest our customers' money profitably. A single unsuccessful transaction may have unforeseeable consequences. If we lose the money that our customers entrust to us, the bank can also lose considerable prestige.

[REFORM] In which new areas will you be turning up?

[Kun] On behalf of the State Property Agency, for example, you will see us directing the sale of worker stocks. According to the plan we have worked out, the worker makes an installment payment of the dividend he has coming to him, so that he does not have to dish out large sums of cash, and after three years he owns the stock. We are also engaged in the reorganization and

privatization of companies. We arrange for and support the appearance of joint enterprises on the stock exchange. We seek out foreign investment partners for firm that need them. It is desirable to appear on the stock exchange. There are many advantages if you are already there, but so far firms have encountered stiff preconditions. Among others, they must furnish information about themselves for the past three years. Some companies have no previous schedule of assets and liabilities, because many of them split off from large enterprises. We have taken the preliminary steps to get several companies listed on the stock exchange, and we took part in promoting the conversion of Budaprint, NEPSZABADSAG, and Chinoin Commercial into corporations.

[REFORM] It is known in banking circles that you have very good contacts within the Soviet Union and that during the next few years these contacts could yield considerable fruit.

[Kun] We have always striven to be number one in cultivating and strengthening East-West relations. We were the first commercial bank to open branches in Basel and Moscow, and we are represented in Tel Aviv as well. The Soviet Union is a potentially enormous market, and we Hungarians must not forget who are neighbors are, our present and future business partners. We were guided by this perception when we began to collaborate with several Soviet republics, mainly the Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the Russian Federation. We also recently opened a new branch in Uzhgorod, capital of Ruthenia. Incidentally, as a result of the changing bank system in the Soviet republics, many new banking institutions have evolved, and they are looking for reliable Hungarian partners. Once business starts to pick up and mutual trust starts to develop, our prospects will be excellent.

#### **Favorable Credit to Farmers Hurt by Drought**

91CH0457D Budapest HETI KIS UJSAG in Hungarian  
8 Mar 91 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Preferential Credit for Victims of Drought"]

[Text] Last year Hungarian farmers were struck by the severest drought of the decade. To help the small-scale producers who suffered, the government has created a special credit fund of 1 billion forints. A reduced-interest loan is available to the farmer who the local authorities verify, on the basis of pertinent statutes, is a victim of drought.

The largest domestic creditors of small-scale agricultural producers, the National Savings Bank (OTP), and the National Credit and Commercial Bank, have agreed to fulfill the task of granting credit.

To ascertain the amount of special credit, the local authorities must indicate in their statement of verification how much arable land was damaged by drought. This determines the amount of available credit, which is

5,000 forints for the first hectare of land (but only in the case of land larger than ½ hectare) and 7,000 forints for each additional hectare.

Interest on the preferential loan is currently 22 percent, but a possible change cannot be ruled out.

At the credit recipient's request, the OTP grants a grace period for repayment of the loan until 30 November 1991. The absolute deadline for repayment is 31 December 1992. The credit is payable in cash. It is deposited either in the applicant's savings account or checking account.

The small-scale agricultural producer must submit his application to the local OTP branch office by 15 March and state his request on the printed form obtainable there.

### **POLAND**

#### **Reprivatization: Former Owners Submit Claims**

91EP0403A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 13,  
30 Mar 91 pp 1, 5

[Article by Jerzy Baczynski: "An Accounting of Wrongs"]

[Text] Mrs. Joanna Bartoszewicz, a resident of Warsaw, wrote a letter to the president, the Senate, and the Council of Ministers: "Gentlemen, are you fighting on behalf of the Branicki's? How do such [people] as the Branicki's have the audacity to demand anything at all? They accumulated their wealth by licking the boots of the czarist throne, betraying the Republic.... Dear Present Decisionmakers—come to your senses." Mrs. Bartoszewicz protests the return of anything at all to the descendants of Xavier Branicki, and adds: "The years since 1939 should be regarded as a national disaster, which took something valuable away from everyone." From her too, because with her bare hands she dug rubble from the sites where the privately owned shops on Marszałkowska and Zielna Streets now stand, and no one paid her for this, either.

A special office for reprivatization cases was opened on the ground floor, right near the door, in the Ministry of Ownership Transformations [MPW] (the former censorship building, but earlier owners could doubtless be found). Officially the ministry is not involved in returning property taken at one time, but after all, it would be hard to refuse to listen to the people, often old and ailing, who came this far in their search for justice. The files contain hundreds of letters and applications, dramatic testimony to our tangled history.

#### **300,000 Problems**

For example, Mr. Bazyli Tokarczuk, from Krosno Voivodship, complains that when he returned from the USSR in 1947 his farm was no longer there. The village had been classified as Ukrainian, the entire population

was displaced, and the land was taken over by the State Treasury. Another person demands the return of an ironworking factory, taken in the 1940's under compulsory state management and then, on the strength of a 1958 law, nationalized. The heirs to the Karl Buhle plants in Lodz (today Ortal) maintain that the factory was taken from them in violation of the law; next, Mr. N. is awaiting the return of a seven-room apartment in a building on Szucha Ave. in Warsaw, a building [which was] "completely unlawfully" given first to the USSR Embassy and then the GDR.

Over 500 applications have been registered in MPW for the return of mills, 338 pertain to the return of agricultural real estate, including estates belonging to the aristocracy, 228 people are applying for recovery of pharmacies, 150 want to take back medium-size industrial plants, and almost 100 are demanding the return of large factories, nationalized in 1946. This is only the tip of the iceberg. Over 50,000 reprivatization applications have already been submitted to the voivodship offices, and if the authorities finally determine the procedure and deadline for filing claims, there may be 200,000-300,000 such applications.

I look through the register of legal acts issued after 1944, by virtue of which the property of civil and legal persons passed to the ownership of the state—there are over 70 items. Today each of these acts of historic justice reveals its dark side—its own accounting of wrongs. There are in this register decrees on which the foundations of the Polish People's Republic was built—decrees on farm reform and nationalization of industry—but there are also many lesser known laws and decrees, directed against private ownership. We have a decree from 12 December 1944 on the takeover of certain forests by the State Treasury; from 26 October 1945 on "ownership and use of land located in Warsaw"; from 28 June 1946 on "criminal responsibility for repudiation of nationality during the 1939-45 war"; "on the takeover of property left by persons displaced to the USSR"; "on the acquisition and transfer of real estate indispensable to the implementation of national economic plans"; on the takeover of pharmacies, inland-waterways navigation inventory, banking reform, etc. The lawyers in the voivodship offices and ministries often have a great deal of difficulty in determining the legal basis on which a confiscation was carried out. They ask the applicants for copies of documents, court verdicts, additional information, after which, as a rule, they recommend patience until the government and the Sejm of the Third Republic decides what, and in what way, will be subject to reprivatization.

"That's all we need," impatiently remarks a certain "high official" (after thinking about it, he asks not to be identified). "If we begin now to right all of the wrongs committed in the last 50 years, then we had better suspend the activities of the state right now. Can you imagine these tens or hundreds of thousands of cases in the courts and offices, the recreation of events going back a few dozen years, the unending disputes between former

and later owners, the trillions of zlotys paid out in damages, the halt to privatization, the strikes of employees fired by the new-old owner, the tenant demonstrations?"

### It Began With the Pharmacies

As long as it was able to, the new government tried to discreetly ignore the subject of reprivatization. Unlike as in the former GDR, for example, where it was openly announced that ownership rights would be restored to previous owners, nothing was said or promised, in order not to create an avalanche. Nevertheless, the avalanche began, and the blame for letting the first stone fall goes to Cefarm. As part of the so-called small privatization, the owner of state pharmacies began to sell them to private individuals. Almost immediately, the disinherited pharmacists came forward and demanded that the fencing procedure, i.e., the selling of stolen property, be stopped. They formed an association in order to jointly demand the return of the pharmacies. The public notoriety given this matter hastened recovery claims by other groups. The former owners of Warsaw real estate and the old capitalists, under the leadership of Jerzy Grohman from the well-known family of Lodz industrialists, formed associations. Today Jerzy Grohman is the president's plenipotentiary for reprivatization affairs and the chief defender of wronged owners. The grassroots movement quickly gained support in parliament. Already in the middle of last year, two draft laws were prepared in the Senate (on the return of and compensation for buildings definitively taken by the state in 1958, and the return of pharmacies). The chief sponsor and champion of these laws was Sen. Henryk Wilk. A group of deputies also presented their own competing bill on reprivatization of property taken by the State Treasury in 1958 (the "small nationalization"). Both these bills passed the first reading in July of last year, after which they were sent to the Sejm Commission on the Economic System and Industrial Policy. This commission, in turn, passed a desideratum, sent to the prime minister, in which it requests that the government establish a "practical scope" of permissible recovery and the anticipated financial impact of this operation on the State Treasury. Only now, after a few months have passed, has the government begun to give serious consideration to this problem. An interdepartmental task force was appointed under the chairmanship of Wojciech Goralczyk, deputy minister of ownership transformations, and for several weeks now reprivatization has been an ever-present subject at the Council of Ministers meetings.

This acceleration of decisions which had been postponed from one month to the next is, in large part, the result of the actions of the president. Lech Walesa, in receiving representatives of the persons wronged (beginning with the Branicki's down to the owners of houses on Klonowa St.) brought up the subject. The appointment of J. Grohman, chairman of the Association of Polish Industrialists, as the president's representative, also spurred on the state administration. "The president," I hear, "has no authority as regards the disposition of State

Treasury assets, therefore how can he appoint a representative to perform functions which are not within his purview?" Nevertheless, the hubbub surrounding reprivatization is growing and something has to be done about it. But what?

"It would be most simple and most fair to return that which the communists took," say the advocates of full reprivatization. It is not just a case of satisfying moral and financial claims. It is also important that ownership reforms are accelerated. Why dream up some kind of complicated formulas to privatize the state's assets, and create new owners, if, as in many cases, owners already exist and are ready to take over and continue to operate the confiscated shops, pharmacies, mills, and factories.

#### How Much Would This Cost?

Minister Goralczyk says that it is no longer a question of whether there will be reprivatization, but how it will be done, because there are applications for indemnity for assets lost in the November Uprising, for war damages, from both wars, at that, for prewar securities, and for assets left within the former boundaries of Poland. "What do you do," asks Minister Goralczyk, "if an unlawfully occupied mill was later purchased in good faith by a private individual out of his own savings? What do you do if a nationalized factory was mortgaged—are the heirs supposed to pay off the creditor's heirs? And what do you do if the workforce does not want the old owner to return—fire everybody?" Minister Goralczyk has a grudge against Polish Television ("A Case for a Reporter"), for its one-sided and misleading presentation of reprivatization problems, while the departmental lawyers are talking with horror about the television speeches of docent Falandysz, spreading "legal bolshevism" in its "reddest" version.

"There seem to be three planes in reprivatization," says Minister Goralczyk. "Moral, legal and economic. From the moral standpoint we should redress all of the wrongs. Legally, this is extremely doubtful, and economically, it is simply unrealistic."

An attempt has been made in MPW to calculate the costs of redress. Naturally, every calculation is only an approximation, nevertheless it came out that the Third Republic, in order to settle the claims against the Polish People's Republic, would have to pay from 60 to 200 trillion zlotys, including, e.g., 6 trillion by virtue of violation of the law on farm reform, 25 trillion by reason of corrupt practices in the nationalization of industry, 12 trillion for compulsory communalization of Warsaw land, over 17 trillion as compensation for 50,000-70,000 repatriates from the other side of the Bug [River], 1 trillion for pharmacies, and several or several dozen trillions for prewar state bonds (if we were to deem them to be valid). And already the next groups of wronged individuals are appearing: the Lemkos, resettled as part of the Vistula campaign, and the empowered representatives of the former Jewish townships.

Deputy Grazyna Staniszewska suggests the following interpretation of morally justified claims. "We should recognize that this part of Europe is in the high-risk zone. After all, the change of borders after World War II also meant that millions of people of different nationalities were wronged, and no serious person demands that the borders now be changed. We cannot reverse history."

#### Dispute About the Legality of the Polish People's Republic

And now we come to the main point of the dispute between the fundamentalists of reprivatization and the pragmatic option, this is, in essence, a dispute about the legality of the Polish People's Republic, about whether to cancel out the entire legal order, which existed for 40 years, as being in conflict with natural law, a Stalinist order, imposed by a foreign power, etc., or whether to recognize that the Polish state [which] existed after 1945 also, and therefore, its decrees and laws, regardless of today's opinion of them, must be respected? The government lawyers, exposing themselves to political attacks, defend the criterion of legalism. A rejection of the Polish People's Republic legal system would mean the invalidation of millions of decisions and documents, from notarial acts, certificates, down to diplomas, or, in reality, the dissolution of the state.

If, for example, [it is determined], on the basis of the decree on farm reform, a 40-hectare farm was taken (despite the 50-hectare limit in effect), or, on the strength of the decree on nationalization, a mill was taken which had a milling capacity of less than 15 tons per day, or a plant unable of employ over 50 persons per shift, etc., that a claim is justified, [then] the departmental minister (agriculture, industry, construction, depending on the building) is empowered to determine the validity of the expropriation decision. Over a hundred buildings have already been returned by following this procedure.

The government is proposing, therefore, that reprivatization be restricted to the following cases:

- Property taken on the basis of the 1918 decree on compulsory state management, a decree which was unlawfully applied during the 1940's and 1950's also to owners living in Poland. Under the law dated 25 February 1958, property remaining under state management passed to state ownership. In this case, the government shares the position of the sponsors of the senate and deputy's reprivatization draft law, deeming the decisions made at that time to be illegal.
- Owners of lost property for which the State Treasury was obligated to pay damages and did not fulfill this obligation, are also entitled to compensation. For example, the law on nationalization provided for compensation in the form of securities (not clearly defined), but the Council of Ministers never issued the applicable executive orders. Owners of Warsaw real estate, who were to have been given substitute plots or paid damages, and owners of property

remaining on the other side of the Bug River, are also entitled to recovery.

- Claims for return of property taken in violation of the law are also considered to be justified.

The main principles of reprivatization were decided, although not yet finally, at the 19 March meeting of the Council of Ministers. Contrary to J. Grohman's concept, the government decided that return in-kind will occur only in exceptional cases. Compensation for lost property will be paid in the form of interest-free capital certificates which can be used to purchase stock or part of the assets of privatized or liquidated enterprises. In order to avoid the complicated, and often impossible to carry out, appraisal of the losses, the compensation will take the form of a lump-sum estimate, which will not correspond to the full amount of the claim. This applies to actual losses as well as to lost profits. Claims will be settled by an administrative procedure, which is faster and less costly than court procedure. Reprivatization cases will be regulated by a single law, which will also state the final date for submitting claims.

Many details pertaining to the scope and procedure of reprivatization have not yet been worked out, but the government is definitely striving to keep the costs of this operation to a minimum and simplify and accelerate the procedure as much as possible. Its motives are clear. It is important that reprivatization not slow down privatization (as experienced in the GDR, for example), that it not strain the State Budget, and that it not cause economic chaos and tension in workplaces. But where is the justice?

Deputy Grazyna Staniszevska said on television, "Reprivatization cannot be looked upon as a settling of past accounts, particularly because today we simply cannot afford it. Anyway, all of us, not only the former owners, have been wronged to some degree over the past 50 years. From whom should the payment of this compensation come?" Minister Goralczyk justified the government's position with the well-phrased opinion that, "settlement of past accounts should not close the roads to the future," and that is what would happen if we were to begin to meet the demands of all those who were wronged.

But it is too bad that because the government did not take an unequivocal position, the hopes of hundreds of thousands of people were aroused. Receiving a handful of certificates instead of their house, factory, or farm, they will feel that they have again been cheated. For them the principle of "maximum fairness at minimal social and financial costs," means simply that the Third Republic is putting a stamp of approval on the ignoble practices of the Polish People's Republic. The wrongs committed cannot be redressed with capital certificates, but, let us truthfully admit, would any of the expropriated people have expected, a few years ago, to get even that much?

### Development of Domestic Information Systems

91EP0406A Warsaw POLITYKA-EKSPORT-IMPORT  
in Polish No 3, Mar 91 p 20

[Article by Michal Ziebinski: "Let Us Computerize Ourselves"]

[Text] A number of government establishments have signed, or are negotiating, large information system contracts on behalf of various state agencies and establishments. Each contract is worth hundreds of billions of zlotys. These decisions, which are unfavorable from both the technical and financial points of view, amount to an effective barrier in the path of the development of Polish computer systems.

A transaction with the French company BULL for the delivery of a tax system for the Ministry of Finance exemplifies such contracts. This contract has caused much controversy, and has become the reason of sorts for a stormy press campaign. However, everything is still the way it was!

The preliminary segment of the contract is being implemented, and the second part is to be signed soon. It is envisaged that BULL will deliver to us a complete turnkey tax system for about 300 billion zlotys (160 million French francs [Fr]). The system will be installed in more than 300 tax offices, and will include more than 5,000 work stations. Personal computers with hooked-up terminals are envisaged as equipment.

A study of the contract brings up a number of fundamental reservations. The equipment being purchased is very expensive. This is the result of, first, ordering personal computers which are on the average two or three times more expensive than microcomputers with the same power, and, second, opting for a supplier who produces incredibly expensive equipment. For comparison, I will quote prices for AT-type personal computers in the French market (with a 40 MB [hard] drive and a color monitor): GOUPII (France), Fr32,000; BULL (France), Fr26,000; IBM (20 MB drive), Fr26,000; IPC (Taiwan), Fr11,500; Amstrad (England), Fr11,000; DOMESTIC (built with imported parts), Fr6,400.

Therefore, the personal computer of the BULL company is more than twice as expensive as its competitors from Taiwan or England, and four times as expensive as its domestic competitor with the same parameters.

The cost of programming developed by the French must be very high. It will suffice to compare monthly charges for the work of a computer programmer in France (Fr50,000, Fr100,000 for export) and in our country (I assume 6 million zlotys, which amounts to Fr3,333 at the exchange rate of 1,800 zlotys to one French frank). Therefore, one month of work by a French computer programmer costs us 30 times more than the same month of work by his Polish colleague. I must add that our programmers are not worse, and in some cases are better than their French colleagues. I am in a position to

make a comparison—I worked in Paris for eight years together with French professionals in this field.

If the above system were provided by our domestic enterprises it would be two times cheaper, that is, 150 billion rather than 300 billion zlotys. This is, after all, the money of the taxpayers.

If this were the only contract the issue would not be that vital. However, many more such contracts are being negotiated and signed at present, and their worth, on the scale of the entire country, will go into trillions of zlotys. This indeed gives us food for thought!

### Everybody Does His Own Thing

The above remarks on the computer automation of taxes apply to a formidable majority of control systems for our central and local establishments, state administration, banks, insurance agencies, customs offices, railroads, the educational system, and so on. At present, everybody is automating, or angling to automate. Among other things, this condition is the result of a complete absence of any strategy in the field of automating our administration and developing domestic information systems as a whole.

A situation whereby every minister will order and purchase computer equipment and systems from different partners and without any coordination will result in tremendous losses for the economy. In addition, it will cause a computer Tower of Babel of sorts to emerge, whereby every ministry or major state institution will own equipment from a different country and a different producer, and information systems will be designed in keeping with different guidelines and concepts. It is easy to predict the difficulties and costs associated with the operation of such systems.

Government orders provide the basis for the development of modern fields of technology in developed countries. Awarding such orders to foreign companies not only pushes the costs up by a factor of two or three, but also robs the Polish computer industry and Polish computer science of their development prospects. Computer science is a strategic field, and it should not be handed over to others thoughtlessly.

It is also necessary to quickly outline the development strategies of automation because we are entering the stage of streamlining management in our state administration and state establishments and industries. In a great majority of cases, this will be associated with the introduction of large computer systems consisting of many hundreds or even thousand of work stations. In total, we should expect about several dozen thousand of such work stations to be installed in the years to come.

At present, contracts are being negotiated or executed which include a dozen or so thousand work stations. The lack of a clear-cut policy of developing computer automation makes it impossible to evaluate these contracts from the standpoint of the global economic interests of

the state. As a result, a number of contracts are detrimental to our computer automation [when] viewed as a whole.

We should say clearly and expressly that in this field, we are not a Third World country. We have our own computer manufacturing industry and many state and private enterprises engaged in programming. We also have a staff of trained and experienced computer electronics specialists, designers, and programmers. We can and should develop such systems ourselves.

Why is this not the case?

First, as I have already mentioned, a vision of the development of computer automation in our country is lacking, that is, the production of hardware and software and the automation of state administration and large enterprises. Second, as a result of this, there is no development strategy. Third, there is no program which would translate this strategy into a set of specific tasks. Fourth, the government circles have thus far been unaware of the fact that computerization may and should be one of the basic driving forces of our development. (I will add parenthetically that in the developed countries the value of products in the field of computer technology will soon exceed the value of products in the automotive industry).

### A Strategy

An analysis of the current development trends of computer automation in the world, and the needs and potential of our country in this sphere compel us to conclude that our strategy should call for:

- Automating state administration, establishments, and enterprises based on the application of microcomputers.
- Using computer equipment assembled or manufactured domestically.
- Domestic enterprises designing and developing software for systems, on the assumption of the use of outside assistance.
- Creating conditions and taking steps at the government level with an eye toward promoting the exports of our computer products.

This strategy will not only reduce the cost of the entire undertaking many times, but will also provide an opportunity for the development of a domestic computer industry and service enterprises providing software and equipment repairs and opportunities for the export of equipment and services; it will provide employment for thousands of people in industry and at service enterprises. In addition, it will allow the state to control the basic information system of the administration which will, as a result, reinforce our independence and provide opportunities for the rational, rapid, and inexpensive computer automation of the remaining state, private, and cooperative enterprises, and, finally, will substantially reduce or altogether bring to an end the emigration of skilled computer personnel.

It is important that we do not have to build large plants. No producer of microcomputers in the world produces all the assemblies and subassemblies needed to manufacture them. In turn, many computer companies exist whose production of microcomputers is based on putting together assemblies and subassemblies manufactured by specialized enterprises. This suggests that the production of basic types of modern microcomputers which are needed to computerize the units of state administration may be started rapidly in our country. Such production may be developed at state or private enterprises.

I also maintain, with the full weight of responsibility, that all control systems for the state administration may be produced by Polish designers and Polish programmers. The possible gaps in the experience of designers in the case of systems which are new to them, such as taxation, banks, customs duties, and insurance, may be easily eliminated by sending general designers for short, one-week, training sessions to appropriate centers in the developed countries which indeed want to help us.

#### More Expensive, but Worse?

It is frequently forgotten in the heat of program discussions and political struggles that political and legislative actions alone will not suffice for the good, dynamic development of the economy. Long-term, stubborn, and persistent actions are necessary in order to ensure progress and economic development. It is the same with computer science. We have good cadres of specialists. Failing to use their skills, experience, and ambition for the good of the country and in the interest of us all would be a fundamental mistake. I am not a proponent of autarchy. However, in this case I cannot reconcile myself to letting foreign enterprises enter our market in a field in which we ourselves can operate, given what is a relatively small effort, mainly of an organizational nature. The overall condition of apathy and chaos in the field of computers has been caused by, among other things, the fact that many creative people with a lot of experience have simply given up, being tired of many years of trying and making efforts in vain. We may understand this situation, but we should not resign ourselves to it. At present, a battle for the independence of the state is being waged in the field of the economy. Everyone who feels that he is a free man should become involved in this battle. We will certainly not become another Japan in the area in question, but we may conquer a decent place for ourselves in Europe if we make rational choices which are backed up by systematic efforts. Computer science is not only a strategic sector of the economy and a factor which makes other sectors dynamic. It is also a sector in which small investment outlays result in a very considerable increment of output

in what is an industry of the future, and one in which gray cells are the most significant raw material.

The benefits of unified and standardized equipment are tremendous. Government orders will naturally generate a similar process of standardization in private enterprises. This is the task of the state. The government cannot avoid this task; it is just that no one else can replace it. It is necessary for the people who determine the ultimate format of state computer systems to be aware of the fact that these systems are financed with taxpayer money; therefore, they should be produced as inexpensively as possible. We do the exact opposite. Having an opportunity to purchase inexpensive systems manufactured by Polish enterprises, we purchase expensive systems abroad. Such decisions used to be called arbitrary. What do you call them now?

#### [Box, p 3]

Michal Ziebinski is a specialist in the field of the organization of management and computer science. He is a graduate of the Technical University of Warsaw and Northeastern University in Boston, who has had many years of experience in computer science work in our country, France, and the United States.

#### Poznan Private Paper Ceases Publication

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1005 GMT 24 Apr 91*

[Text] Recently, newspapers have come and gone. Failures are never pleasant. Please listen to a report from Poznan.

[Reporter] On Monday 22 April, the DZISIAJ—DZIENNIK WIELKOPOLAN [TODAY—THE GREAT POLAND REGION DAILY] ceased publication. After GAZETA WYBORCZA, this was the second private newspaper formed independently from the RSW [Worker's Cooperative Publishing House] syndicate. The newspaper's owner was the Wydawnictwo Wielkopolskie, a joint-stock company. Following nearly year-long, unceasing financial difficulties, the company's board decided to declare its insolvency. The greatest controversy among journalists was aroused by the way the newspaper was liquidated, without informing the [editorial] team of this fact, and, as it transpired, with the unnecessary preparation of the Monday edition. A separate problem is that of the employees' claims and the possibilities of paying them in light of the firm's financial collapse. According to information from journalists of the DZISIAJ—DZIENNIK WIELKOPOLAN, it transpires that the editorial team intends to try and find a new sponsor and once again bring the title to the kiosks.

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